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ABSTRACT
This thesis aims to discover how the American Cosa Nostra transformed in the early 20th century.
The goal of this project is to show how the American mafia’s interactions with the US government
evolved the mafia from a group of discriminated immigrants into consummate insiders who adapted to the
American historical landscape. To explore this transformation and evolving relationship, this thesis
analyzed numerous sources from US government archives and personal testimonies of American Cosa
Nostra members. The American Cosa Nostra operated as a shadowy, yet powerful organization
throughout much of the 20th century. During this time, the American mafia influenced politics,
economics, and society through their broad and profitable activities.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 9, 1958, federal agents submitted a classified report to Federal Bureau of
Investigation Director J. Edgar Hoover regarding the “Mafia” which included “evidence
indicating that the Mafia existed” within the borders of the United States.1 This internal Bureau
report— which acquainted Hoover with the current American mafia situation— detailed the
southern Italian and Sicilian origins of the Mafia, the Mafia’s code of conduct, the Mafia’s
movement from Italy to the United States during the 19th and 20th centuries, and the current
suspected enterprises of the organization. The agents and analysts who furnished this paper
displayed real courage by refuting their infamously egocentric director’s previous statements
regarding the Mafia. Since 1933, Hoover had repeatedly denied that any highly-organized
criminal syndicate existed within America— a denial which resulted from Hoover’s belief in his
agency and himself.2 Cartha DeLoach, Hoover’s third-in-command at the Bureau, believed that

1

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mafia Monograph, Memorandum to Director, FBI 06/04/1958, Mafia in United
States, Section II, Bureau File Number 100-42303-330, found in the FBI Records: The Vault, accessed November 3,
2013. The Vault is an open-source, online archive assembled and maintained by historians and archivists employed
by the FBI and Department of Justice. The Vault holds over 10,000 pages of primary source materials. The Vault
includes several different search programs that assist researchers in accessing all declassified documents pertaining
to specific cases or notable people that were of interest to the FBI. Both the alphabetical and thematic search
systems are limited by the amount of primary source materials FBI historians have placed online. The Vault is
typically updated twice a year to include new materials and sources that have been released after Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) requests have been filed by researchers worldwide. Included in the Vault are FBI files that
have been released to the public, Department of Justice files that have been declassified, as well as formerly
classified records previously only shared within law enforcement circles. The Vault can be accessed through the link
http://vault.fbi.gov/.
2
Richard Powers, in Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover (New York: Free Press, 1987), 335, suggests
that Hoover’s ego and pride contributed to his unwillingness to investigate organized crime. In response to an earlier
Department of Justice Special Group on Organized Crime, Hoover publicly berated the Special Group and
exclaimed the FBI would never create a group simply to “[garner] publicity and speculative ventures about a
rumored syndicate.”
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Hoover’s “profound contempt for the criminal mind, combined with his enormous faith in the
agency he had created, persuaded him that no such complex national criminal organization could
exist without him knowing about it… he didn’t know about it; ergo, it did not exist.”3 However,
on November 14, 1957, local police in the upstate New York town of Apalachin discovered a
conference of over 60 organized crime leaders who all had connections to a shadowy
organization— the American mafia.4 This finding revealed to the FBI that a sinister national
crime empire indeed existed.5 Even after the Apalachin conference, Hoover remained committed
to the idea that organized crime posed no credible threat to America’s security, despite
arguments and information provided by numerous FBI personnel and D.C. politicians.6 Perhaps
the most damning evidence demonstrating Hoover’s lack of action against the American mafia
was his distribution of agents within the FBI’s New York Field Office in 1959. This field office,
which stood in the heart of mafia territory, housed over 400 agents dedicated to investigating
communist activities, but only had 4 agents actively investigating organized crime. 7 Curiously,
Hoover did not investigate claims that the American mafia existed, especially considering its

Cartha DeLoach, Hoover’s FBI: The Inside Story by Hoover’s Trusted Lieutenant (Washington, DC: Regnery
Publishing, 1995), 303.
4
Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The FBI: A History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 164; DeLoach, Hoover’s
FBI: The Inside Story, 297; Fred Cook, The FBI Nobody Knows (Salem, MA: Pyramid Books, 1965), 229.
5
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mafia Monograph, Memorandum to Director, FBI 06/04/1958, Mafia in United
States, Section II, Bureau File Number 100-42303-330, electronic page 22 out of 115, which reads describes the
Apalachin conference as “a convention of hoodlums interrupted by local law enforcement on November 14, 1957.”
See also, Mafia Monograph Part 3 of 4, electronic pages 23-25 of 72, which explain that “many FBI sources agree
that there is a Mafia in existence in the United States at the present time” and goes on to list the numerous sources
and the information they provided the FBI regarding the Mafia. Found in the FBI Records: The Vault, accessed
November 3, 2013.
6
Cook, The FBI Nobody Knows, 230; Powers, Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover, 335; Sanford
Ungar, FBI (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), 392-393. For an account of the struggle within the Bureau to get Hoover
to change the FBI’s policy regarding the Mafia’s non-existence, see William C. Sullivan, The Bureau (New York:
Pinnacle Books, 1981), 121.
7
Cook, The FBI Nobody Knows, 229; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1978), 264. It should be noted that the agents assigned to the communist investigative unit in New York
also had to track Soviet and Eastern bloc espionage officers who operated under numerous U.N. diplomatic covers.
This mission stood as an enormous task for the Bureau, and therefore the manpower required was exceedingly high.
This does not absolve the Bureau for lacking in manpower regarding organized crime cases, but it does help put into
perspective why the number of counterintelligence agents was so high.
3
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members were part of the immigrant class which Hoover notoriously found suspect. Although
theories abound as to why Hoover strenuously resisted investigating the mafia, most historians
contend that the early American mafia simply did not violate many federal laws, and therefore
existed outside of the FBI’s jurisdiction.8 Investigative journalist Selwyn Raab argued that
Hoover eventually acknowledged the Mafia’s existence, but maintained a reluctance to
investigate the American mafia due to three main factors— his distaste for long, frustrating
investigations that held limited success, his concern that the American mafia had the money to
corrupt agents and therefore undermine the Bureau’s impeccable reputation, and finally his fear
that the mafia’s political connections could influence certain congressmen and senators to trim
the FBI’s budget.9
What allowed the American mafia to evade Hoover’s wrath up to the late 1950s? One
answer, which this thesis will pursue, is that the American Cosa Nostra (ACN), which is a more
accurate name for this organization, had by the 1950s integrated itself so fully into social fabric
of the United States, especially in terms of economic and political influence, that the FBI could
hardly identify or ‘see’ its crimes, let alone do anything to stop them. How did a group composed
of immigrants and the children of immigrants, who only fifty years before were considered
undesirable outsiders by the majority of native-born Americans, emerge by the mid-20th century
as consummate insiders with deputies in city, state, and federal politics, with economic clout, and
DeLoach, Hoover’s FBI: The Inside Story, 303; Cook, The FBI Nobody Knows, 227; Jeffreys-Jones, The FBI: A
History, 165. For rumors about a brokered deal between FBI agents and organized crime leaders, see interview
George Allen, in Demaris, The Director, 23; also Hank Messick, John Edgar Hoover: An Inquiry in the Life and
Times of John Edgar Hoover and His Relationship to the Continuing Partnership of Crime, Business and Politics
(New York: David McKay, 1972). Another theory about why Hoover did not acknowledge the mob’s existence
includes a blackmail plot against Hoover regarding the alleged incident of Hoover publicly appearing in women’s
clothing, but this theory seems to be lacking in credibility. The origin of this theory comes from Mrs. Susan
Rosenstiel, the former wife of a mob-connected liquor distributor. Mrs. Rosenstiel later served jail time for two
separate charges of perjury in an unrelated case, so her testimony should be considered dubious.
9
Selwyn Raab, Five Families: The Rise, Decline, and Resurgence of America's Most Powerful Mafia Empires,
(New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2006), 89.
8
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with a kind of social respectability? I argue that this transformation of the ACN and its
integration into American society occurred because of the deliberate and conscientious actions
by ACN leaders who navigated the changing American landscape from the early 1900s to the
1960s, particularly by learning to take advantage of changes in American law and governance
from the 1920s to the 1940s.
The adaptations of the ACN in response to decisions of the American government
occurred not because its members were removed or above the everyday goings-on of American
life, but rather because they made a conscientious effort to Americanize their organization and
activities. These adjustments to American culture were not automatic or mechanical, but due to
the agency of the ACN’s leaders through the measured steps they took to exploit the
opportunities that changes in government made possible. This process required the ACN to break
away from old-world traditions and practices, particularly the code of anti-government conduct,
exemplified in the rule of omertà that had defined their organized crime forebears in Italy and
had shaped early organized crime groups in the United States. The Americanized leaders of the
ACN sought to profit through any means, including working with or exploiting the US
government throughout the twentieth century, even if it meant partially rejecting central
principles that defined the traditions they claimed fealty to.
Chapter One details the origins of the Mala Vita groups— or the three organized crime
groups in southern Italy and Sicily— and also demonstrates that the Sicilian mafia grew in power
due to the long-term weaknesses of the Italian government, and examines the struggles of Italian
immigrants in America— a situation in which many American mafia members found
themselves. American nativism of the 1890s and 1900s placed Italian and Sicilian immigrants
within a category of unwanted and suspicious persons who were looked down upon by the well4

established Anglo-Saxon community. These nativist ideas, built upon anti-Catholic prejudices,
pervasive anti-radical opinions, and the belief in a superior “white” race, forced Italian, Sicilian
and Jewish immigrants to band together in an effort to survive the new world.
The second chapter explains the growth of the American mafia during the Prohibition era
when the anti-government code of the “old-world” mafia diminished for members of the ACN.
During the 1920s, the American mafia underwent a transformation from a traditional Italian
organized crime clan to an Americanized national crime organization— a change spurred on by
the deliberate decisions and agency of American-raised mafia leaders like Charlie Luciano,
Frank Costello and Vito Genovese. For the American mafia, this era was defined by a new form
of organization that relied upon cooperation with government officials and activities that broke
the laws of Prohibition which few ordinary citizens respected. This new organizational structure
mirrored broader business changes of the time and allowed the ACN to overcome some nativist
discrimination. The smuggling and bootlegging activities of the American mafia helped cultivate
corrupt government connections and public support for the organization.
The third chapter examines how the repeal of Prohibition forced the ACN to move into
other criminal activities while still trying to use their new political and social connections. The
ACN in the 1930s continued to interact with citizens during the Great Depression, maintained its
relationship with Jewish gangs, and expanded into numerous profitable, illegal activities. Many
of these activities profited from both the Great Depression and the political reform measures of
the New Deal. The continuously increasing size of the US government created a multitude of
opportunities for the American Cosa Nostra to make new profits and accrue more power and
influence.

5

The fourth and final chapter explores the continuing Americanization of the ACN and
their ongoing relationship with the US government during World War II and the Cold War. The
ACN’s increasing ties to government action, particularly through the areas of intelligence and the
black market, profited the American mafia and allowed them to grow in power and prestige. The
chapter concludes by proposing that the 1957 Apalachin conference both marked the high point
of the ACN and led ultimately to its demise.
This thesis contributes to the historiography of organized crime by addressing how the
ACN transformed over the course of the twentieth century, highlighting its responses to
government actions. Through interactions with the government and a deliberate Americanizing
of the organization to mirror broader cultural and political changes, the ACN actively changed
over time— a change that is conspicuously underplayed in the current historiography.10
Organized crime historian David Critchley famously wrote that the historiography of “early
organized crime [is] poorly formulated, sketchily drawn, and empirically weak.”11 In comparison
to other historians, my sources and focus on ACN responses to government actions and fill a gap
in the historiography of organized crime. Humbert Nelli’s work is probably the closest to my
own since he focuses on the 1860-1940 period and emphasizes the American mafia’s activities in
the early 20th century.12 The inclusion of more recent sources in this thesis, as well as my

10

Notable historians and authors who have written about the American mafia Herbert Asbury, Great Illusion an
Informal History of Prohibition (Greenwood: Praeger, 1950); Sean Dennis Cashman, Prohibition, The Lie of the
Land (New York: Free Press, 1981); John Dickie, Cosa Nostra: A History of the Sicilian Mafia (London: Hodder &
Stoughton, 2004); Stephen R. Fox, Blood and Power: Organized Crime in Twentieth-Century America (New York:
W. Morrow, 1989); James B. Jacobs, Coleen Friel, and Robert Radick, Gotham Unbound: How New York City Was
Liberated from the Grip of Organized Crime (New York: New York University Press, 1999); Cecil Kirby and
Thomas C. Renner, Mafia Enforcer (New York: Villard Books, 1987); Virgil W. Peterson, Mob: 200 Years of
Organized Crime in New York (Ottawa: Jameson Books, 1983); and Gay Talese, Honor Thy Father (New York: Ivy
Books, 1981).
11
David Critchley, Routledge Advances in American History, vol. 1, The Origin of Organized Crime in America: the
New York City Mafia, 1891-1931 (New York: Routledge, 2009), 6.
12
Humbert S. Nelli, The Business of Crime: Italians and Syndicate Crime in the United States (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1976).
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argument that the ACN changed over time as it adjusted to changes in governance builds on and
extends Nelli’s work, particularly elaborating on the continuing Americanization of the ACN
during World War II and into the post-war period, which Nelli does not cover. This continuation
of the ACN adaptation to American culture helps explain the organization’s long-term success
and provides more evidence that the ACN profited off of responding to government action, even
during wartime.
The primary sources used in this thesis, especially those made available through the
internet archives of government agencies, allow for intervention to be made in the historiography
of organized crime reveal the transformation of the American mafia and its responses to
governmental actions during the 20th century. Historian John Dickie and his primary sources on
Italian organized crime, many of which are based on the Italian government’s records, were
invaluable to my contextual understanding of the Mala Vita groups.13 Dickie’s analysis of the
mafia code of omertà, as well as his exploration of the ‘Ndrangheta, the Camorra, and the
Sicilian mafia, illuminated the links between the American mafia and the three “honored
societies” of Italy and Sicily. Dickie’s view of the historiography of organized crime exposed the
trickiness of researching this topic before these sources were available, notably when he wrote,
“It has only been since the 1980s that organized crime has been perceived as having a
history worth researching and recounting. The birth of the ‘new historiography’ of
organized crime is closely related to judicial investigation since the 1980s and the
corresponding mafia informants. What has emerged in the last few years is a much fuller
historical description of the mafia… [replacing] the fuzzy lines of sociological jargon.”14
Dickie’s perspective that mafia insiders changed the historiography of the topic rings true
considering that previously the motives, intentions, and agency of these individuals remained
13

John Dickie, Cosa Nostra: A History of the Sicilian Mafia (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2004); John Dickie,
Blood Brotherhoods: The Rise of the Italian Mafias (London: Sceptre, 2011).
14
John Dickie Cosa Nostra: A History of the Sicilian Mafia, 20-25.
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cloaked in secrecy and not available for analysis. The links between Dickie’s Mala Vita groups
and the American mafia are not complete; his work was essential for highlighting the adaptations
of the ACN and showing the efforts to Americanize by the ACN leaders. Other primary sources
in this thesis include recently unclassified files from the FBI archives, including the FBI’s
Monograph on the Mafia from 1958, files pertaining to Meyer Lansky, Arnold Rothstein, and
various other ACN and underworld personalities. The testimonies of American mafia leader
Charlie “Lucky” Luciano and lower-tier mafia enforcer Joe Valachi both greatly contributed to
the analysis of the deliberate actions of the ACN. Martin Gosch, a screenwriter and amateur
historian, co-authored a controversial book entitled The Last Testament of Lucky Luciano with
notable organized crime writer Richard Hammer. The book’s controversial nature stems from
claims that Charlie Luciano’s words were never taped, but conversations between Luciano and
Gosch were simply dictated. However, considering the secretive nature of the illegal business
that Luciano helped develop, it is no surprise that restrictions were placed on how the
information was recorded. Interestingly, the controversy over the authenticity of The Last
Testament originates from the work of another important investigative journalist used in this
paper— Peter Maas. As the author of The Valachi Papers, Maas interviewed low-level ACN
enforcer Joe Valachi, who was the first ACN member willing to testify to both law enforcement
agencies and in front of Congress. Although Peter Maas and the FBI agents who interviewed
Valachi corroborated his accounts of crimes with NYPD records and federal intelligence, they
were unable to validate Valachi’s actual intentions of explaining his past crimes. In examining
the source reliability of this book, Valachi’s testimony stands up well, especially since it can be
corroborated by other sources, but Valachi fails to accurately represent the intent behind the
crimes of the American mafia and instead tries to portray the organization as honorable. Still,

8

Maas’s work set a precedent for future journalists and historians alike in that he was able to
interview and publish a retired American mafia member’s perspective on organized crime in the
United States. In no small way, Maas’s work transformed the historiography of organized crime
by opening up the possibility that the intentions and agency of ACN members could be
discovered and analyzed. Additionally, Maas’s interview and resulting publication of Valachi’s
story was perhaps the first nationally recognized break from the traditional mafia code of omertà
because it openly revealed the secret customs and crimes committed by American Cosa Nostra
members. Both Luciano and Valachi’s testaments were invaluable due to their illumination of the
multiple views that existed within the ACN regarding its activities. Luciano’s testimony gives
great insight into the formation and motives of the early ACN, while Valachi’s perspective
reveals how the rank-and-file mafia soldiers responded to changes inside and outside their
organization.
Further evidence in this thesis comes from newspapers, works by investigative reporters,
and government commissioned investigations and their concluding reports. Newspaper accounts
contextualize the relevant period and fairly show how the public reacted to specific actions of
either the ACN or the government. Investigative reporter Selwyn Raab’s work assisted this thesis
in providing a straightforward recounting of the past actions of the American mafia in clear,
chronological order.15 The governmental reports, particularly those in the later chapters, broadly
investigated and addressed interstate crime over several decades and are invaluable in seeing the
responses of the ACN to governmental action. However, the chronological scope of these reports
are so long that the reports sometimes appear to be out of date in relation to the time period for

15

Raab, Five Families, vii-xii.

9

which they are providing evidence. However, it is simply the length and latitude of these
investigations which generated the reports years or even decades later.
In regards to terminology, approaching the study of the American mafia is a complex and
challenging process made all the more difficult by the common misuse of terms to define or
describe organized crime. For the purposes of this paper, organized crime will be used to refer to
any group that is centralized and commits crimes almost exclusively for profit. Furthermore,
crime groups composed of individuals of Sicilian/Italian origin or descent in the United States
will be referred to as either the “American mafia” or the “American Cosa Nostra.” Arguably the
most frequent pitfall for historians, journalists, and federal agents who have studied the
phenomenon of organized crime is the application of terms that are ambiguous or outright
misleading.16 Looking to the origins of terms commonly used to describe Italian organized
crime, several theories abound about the origins of the terms mafia and Cosa Nostra.17 The most
widely accepted theory about the term mafia states that the Sicilian adjective mafioso derives
from either the slang Arabic word mahyas, which is closely translated to “aggressive braggart,”

One great example of this mistake is revealed in statements made by the Department of Justice’s Organized Crime
Intelligence and Analysis Unit during the hearings at President Ronald Reagan’s Commission on Organized Crime.
This unit presented their “Chronological History of La Cosa Nostra in the United States,” which began with the
1890 murder of police superintendent David Hennessey in 1890. Citing this publicized murder, the subsequent trial,
and the mob-lynching of the accused Italian men, the Justice Department unit contended that these events, “created
perhaps the first significant public awareness of the La Cosa Nostra (LCN).” The Hennessey murder, in fact, did not
make anyone aware of “La Cosa Nostra” as a term because that particular term had not been invented and certainly
not popularized until the mid-20th century. Evidence for this mistake can be found in the U.S. Department of Justice,
Criminal Investigative Division, Organized Crime Section, Organized Crime Intelligence and Analysis Unit,
“Chronological History of La Cosa Nostra in the United States, January 1920-August 1987” in Hearings, Organized
Crime: 25 Years After Valachi, U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 294; Robert J. Kelly, Ko-lin Chin, and
Rufus Schatzberg, eds., Handbook of Organized Crime in the United States (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,
1994), 42.
17
According to Mafia informants cooperating with the FBI, the true name of the mafia is the “Cosa Nostra,” which
translates into “Our Thing.” Joseph Valachi, one of the first FBI informants to testify against the American Cosa
Nostra, stated before the U.S. Senate that most members in the mafia referred to their organization by the term Cosa
Nostra. Peter Maas in The Valachi Papers (New York: Bantam Books, 1968); Alan A. Block, “Organized Crime:
History and Historiography,” found in Robert J. Kelly, Ko-lin Chin, and Rufus Schatzberg, eds., Handbook of
Organized Crime in the United States, 42.
16
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or another slang Arabic term marfud, which means “one who is rejected.” In the opinion of
several scholars, the term “mafia,” as it was understood in Sicily, referenced a group that had
“swagger, boldness or bravado.”18 In regards to a single man, the term mafioso in Sicily during
the nineteenth century uniquely identified an arrogant, enterprising, proud person who had no
fear.19 For the purposes of this thesis, the Italian and Sicilian-based crime groups will be referred
to by their publicized names— the Sicilian mafia, the ‘Ndrangheta, and the Camorra. The
Sicilian mafia will refer to the criminal organization based on the island of Sicily. The
‘Ndrangheta was a competing criminal organization based out of Calabria, the boot-tip region of
Italy. Finally, originating out of the Italian city of Naples, the Camorra was another Italian-based
criminal group. Crossing the Atlantic, the term Black Hand will refer to a loose collection of
criminals that specialized in extortion or minor protection rackets during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.

18

Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1996), 4-8, 12-16.
19
Gambetta, Sicilian Mafia, 3-8.
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I. MAFIA ORIGINS AND IMMIGRATION TO AMERICA
As stated in the Introduction, this paper analyzes the American mafia’s transformation
over time through the active integration of its members into American society and politics. The
best place to begin this analysis is by looking at the origins of Italian organized crime, followed
by a comparison between Italian crime groups and the American mafia in the early twentieth
century. This first chapter links Italian organized crime groups to the American mafia by
drawing out the characteristics that the American mafia emulated from the older Italian crime
groups. This chapter breaks down the histories of the three major Italian crime groups— the
Sicilian mafia, the ‘Ndrangheta, and the Camorra. Examining these groups’ violent methods,
structuring, and codes of conduct reveals direct parallels between them and the early American
mafia. The early American mafia practiced old-world traditions as they faced Anglo-Saxon
nativist rejection and became outsiders to American culture and communities. This chapter will
attempt to explain how the major Italian crime groups, especially the Sicilian mafia, grew in
power due to the long-term weaknesses of the Italian government. All three groups share similar
characteristics which include a culture of secrecy, close family ties, racial exclusiveness, intense
hatred and disrespect for any government officials, the systematic use of intimidation and
vengeance as a matter of policy, and the regular recourse to murder as a means to an end.1

1

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mafia Monograph, Memorandum to Director, FBI 06/04/1958, Mafia in United
States, Section II, Bureau File Number 100-42303-330, electronic pages ii out of 115, found in the FBI Records:
The Vault, accessed November 3, 2013.

12

There are two different ways Italian organized crime can be viewed: as a protective group
which originated to defend their homeland from foreign invaders or as a group that assisted their
local citizenry with problems of law and order when the national Italian government was
ineffectual.2 All these descriptions of Italian criminal organizations have been debated by
historians for over a century.3 The three “honored societies” all emerged from the complex
historical background of Sicily and southern Italy— a history in which the island of Sicily
remains one of the most conquered places on Earth. The island’s invaders have included the
Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Greeks, Romans, Muslims, Spanish, Byzantines, Normans, and the
French Bourbon kings.4 Throughout the centuries, these conquering empires have instilled into
the Sicilian people a preference for private systems of revenge and a hearty distrust, if not
outright contempt, of formal government.5 This contempt of the government, which extends to
all governmental representatives, led to the creation of omertà, a code of anti-government
conduct which directly connects the Italian “honored societies.”6
Although tracing the origins of these groups is incredibly difficult due to their secretive
nature and lack of formal histories, a brief look at these groups’ origins is helpful in connecting
these groups to one another and later to the American mafia. Several arguments exist as to both
when and why these groups appeared, but the most convincing argument looks not to the

2

Dickie, Cosa Nostra, 4-15; John Dickie, Blood Brotherhoods, 5-12.
Looking specifically at the Italian organized criminal organizations, John Dickie expands on the works of historian
Salvatore Lupo, and his examination of the origins and growth of the “honored societies” in southern Italy and
Sicily. Dickie notes that Lupo revises some of the previous histories on the mafias that blamed ethnic factors on the
rise of the mafia.
4
Dickie, Blood Brotherhoods, 4; Gaia Servadio, Mafioso: A History of the Mafia from Its Origins to the Present
Day (London: Secker & Warburg, 1976), 7-14.
5
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mafia Monograph, Memorandum to Director, FBI 06/04/1958, Mafia in United
States, Section II, Bureau File Number 100-42303-330, electronic pages i-iii out of 115, found in the FBI Records:
The Vault, accessed November 3, 2013.
6
Dickie, Mafia Republic, 38.
3
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strength of these organizations but rather to the weaknesses of the Italian government.7 The
modern blight of organized crime, which Italian citizens have endured for centuries, arose from
the citizens’ own need for better protection from hostile conquering governments and unjust
landowners. Late nineteenth century Palermo police Chief Antonio Cutrera perceived that the
long history of subsequent invaders had produced a people who were suspicious, intolerant, and
above all, enemies of the government.8 FBI analysts once believed that the mafia originated after
standing as a liberating force against foreign invaders of Sicily, but they truly gained power as a
natural result of political and economic forces in Sicily, especially during the oppressive regimes
of foreign rulers in the early nineteenth century. 9 Other historians have attempted to trace the
origins of the mafia to the mid-nineteenth century where it emerged as a secret society of
avengers who assassinated unpopular magistrates guilty of not following the code of omertà.10
Still, other arguments range from the mafia originating to ensure public order during oppressive
regimes to mafia members forming protection rackets in response to corrupt police forces.11
Regardless of the origins of these honored societies, the Sicilian mafia, the Camorra, and the
‘Ndrangheta—collectively known in southern Italy as Mala Vita— all employed similar
techniques to control and profit from their respective communities.12
Historians look to the year 1860 as a major turning point for the mafias in southern Italy
and Sicily. During that year, Italian commander Giuseppe Garibaldi struggled to unify Italy.
After landing in Sicily and rallying over a thousand citizens to fight and remove the foreign
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rulers of the island, he quickly declared himself dictator and instituted a new ruling class of
governors while plans for Italian unification were being debated in Rome.13 During this period of
uncertainty, crime and violence surged. In an attempt to unify Sicily with mainland Italy, a vote
was called, but only one percent of Sicilians voted due to literacy and class restrictions.
Integrating Sicily into Italy proved very difficult for the new Italian government. The already
well-established Sicilian mafia held economic, political, and social power over the island through
a long-standing system of vendettas, familial ties, and extortion practices.14 The Italian
government did not anticipate the struggle against the Sicilian mafia, believing the power in the
political, legislative, and judicial systems would be easily obtainable after Garibaldi’s landing.15
The Sicilian mafia had long held tight control of the judicial system in Sicily by employing its
own strict code of conduct to the citizenry under its control, and enforcing that code through the
use of assassinations, threatening messages, assaults, and economic reprisals against those who
go against their code.16 Arising out of its tumultuous history of conquering governments
possessing unfair judicial systems, Sicilians held a public appreciation for private justice— an
appreciation that the Sicilian mafia strongly encouraged. Due to the intense poverty and mass
illiteracy in both Sicily and southern Italy, the Mala Vita functioned as an analogous government
to assist the people with problems they had from either the government or oppressive landowning aristocrats.17 Due to the Mala Vita groups’ enduring presence in both Sicily and southern
Italy, members of the new Italian government realized that “no Sicilian government had ever
been able to stamp out criminality because the [Mala Vita] had for so long been the only form of

13

Dickie, Blood Brotherhoods, 108-110.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mafia Monograph, Memorandum to Director, FBI 06/04/1958, Mafia in United
States, Section II, Bureau File Number 100-42303-330, electronic page 2-3 out of 115, found in the FBI Records:
The Vault, accessed November 3, 2013.
15
Servadio, Mafioso, 33.
16
Gambetta, Sicilian Mafia, 4-6.
17
Gambetta, Sicilian Mafia, 4-6; John Dickie, Blood Brotherhoods, 6-7.
14

15

stability.”18 By governing private justice in Sicily, the Sicilian mafia held the upper hand in its
fight against the new Italian government for control of Sicily.
During the period of Risorgimento, the Sicilian mafia began to take on a more powerful
role in Sicilian politics. Risorgimento, a political and social movement that occurred from 1815
through the 1870s, aimed to consolidate different states on the Italian peninsula into a single
Italian state of the Kingdom of Italy. Before Garibaldi’s successful ousting of Sicily’s foreign
invaders, the Sicilian mafia had acted as a stable judicial and political force on the island through
its encouragement of private justice through vendettas and use of illicit electoral practices. The
Sicilian mafia further held judicial and political power through corrupt contacts in the police and
low levels of government.19 It was these contacts that allowed the Sicilian mafia to corrupt police
stations, issue gun permits at will to its own members, and even interfere with where and how
police patrols were organized in specific areas of Sicily, most notably Conca d’Oro.20 Through
controlling the police, particularly by controlling the police at a local level, the Sicilian mafia
could maintain its criminal empire with impunity. Some historians question whether the groups
of Mala Vita saw their empires as criminal or instead if they believed they were just providing a
service of a parallel government to counteract the incompetent governments of the past? Perhaps
their initiation oaths, said as each new member ignited and burned a picture of a Catholic saint in
their hands, answer that question directly, “[I will] distribute among the members the proceeds of
ransoms, extortions, robberies, and other crimes perpetrated in the common cause… [I will] wipe
out offenses against any other member with blood… [And I will] carry out the defense of
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members who [fall] into police hands [by] killing witnesses and paying defense costs.”21 The
Sicilian mafia and other crime groups in southern Italy saw themselves as criminals, even though
they also acted as parallel governments through their enforcement of vendettas and codes of
conduct.
The national political changes brought on by the Risorgimento gave new government
officials in Rome decision-making power regarding the future of Sicily, infuriating the Sicilian
mafia and many Sicilian citizens.22 Responding to this threat from members of the northern
Italian government, the Sicilian mafia extorted, bribed or corrupted members of the new Italian
government, which greatly increased the position of the Sicilian mafia in political and economic
matters.23 One example to the extent that the Sicilian mafia could corrupt government officials is
revealed in the actions of Inspector Matteo Ferro, who headed up the police department of Castel
Molo in 1875. Ferro actively protected the local mafia chieftain, Giovanni Cusimano, and his
men from police investigations, going so far as to become a character witness for Cusimano,
stating that the well-known mafia chieftain “[was] an upright man, an individual completely
devoted to law and order.”24
With this widespread type of police corruption throughout Sicily, it is no great surprise
that it was not until 1876 that inquiries were made into the Cosa Nostra of Sicily by the Italian
government. The answers to how it functioned or who led the well-known but mysterious
organization were unclear until two Tuscan deputies, Sidney Sonnino and Leopoldo Franchetti,
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conducted an unofficial inquiry into the lowest classes of Sicily.25 Arriving in Sicily
unannounced, the two men interviewed the lowliest of the island’s inhabitants, and discovered
just how deeply rooted the Sicilian mafia was in everyday life. Sonnino and Franchetti concluded
in their study that, “the [Sicilian] mafia [was] neither an organization nor a passing development:
its great effectiveness had come from infiltrating successive governments and cooperating with
the police. Its main function [was] that of enforcing rudimentary order in an archaic system, and
crimes were a means to an end of winning respect, money, and power.”26 Sonnino and
Franchetti’s investigation is considered one of the most in-depth and realistic accounts of the
Mafia.27 Their investigation examined the everyday reality of Sicilian life in an effort to
understand how the Sicilian mafia influenced almost everything in society. Before this study, the
Sicilian mafia and its operations were only understood from a political and economic
perspective. Sonnino and Franchetti’s contribution lay in their understanding of how the Sicilian
mafia influenced ordinary, everyday life, which is crucial to understanding Italian organized
crime as a whole. In short, Sicily’s own varied history and multiple, ineffective governments led
to the creation and continuation of the illegitimate parallel governance by the effective Sicilian
mafia. Sicily’s track record of judicially incompetent governments nurtured an atmosphere where
those who were clever and bold enough to manipulate the government could benefit and build
their organization’s power, respect, and above all, wealth.28
While there are many similarities between the groups of Mala Vita, an examination of
their differences in their tactics and structures reveals how they overcame the weaknesses of
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Italy’s constantly ineffective governments. Most criminals advance their operational techniques
as circumstances change, as new technologies become commonplace, and as political landscapes
shift. The honored societies of Italy, on the other hand, held fast to their signature crimes of
protection rackets, murder, kidnapping, extortion, and political corruption.29 The Sicilian mafia,
the Camorra, and the ‘Ndrangheta all developed their organizations’ reputations based on how
ruthlessly and efficiently they committed these crimes. The ‘Ndrangheta utilized its personnel
for extensive kidnapping campaigns, while the Sicilian mafia and the Camorra became known
for their brutally effective assassination schemes. The Sicilian mafia also held immense sway as
a political corruptor, able to bribe or threaten judges, police officers, and influential landowners
in their areas of operation.30 These crimes not only helped the Mala Vita but later assisted the
American Cosa Nostra in gaining and retaining power.
Out of the three major groups of the Mala Vita, the Sicilian mafia arguably stood as the
premier and most successful organized criminal group in the Western world for decades. The
organization was so well-known that current and emerging criminal organizations are still
labeled “mafias,” a word that originally referred to the Sicilian mafia. As stated previously, the
Sicilian mafia emerged and grew in power in response to the weaknesses of the Italian
government. Italian police in the late nineteenth century did not hold the public trust, so local
Italian elites recruited groups of young men to hunt down thieves and negotiate the return of
stolen property. These negotiations typically resulted in a pardon for the thieves and a service fee
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to be paid by the elites to the protection gang after they returned the elite’s property. Many
members of these protection gangs were often former criminals and thieves themselves, and
therefore collusion between the thieves and the protection groups became commonplace.31 In
short, the eventual empire of the Cosa Nostra of Sicily originated with protection rackets for
those who could not rely on the protection of the Italian government.32 Crime expert Robert T.
Anderson argued that the Sicilian mafia changed as Sicily itself changed.33 Part of that
transformation, Anderson argued, was the Sicilian mafia’s gradual expansion of their
“techniques of exploitation” from the traditional rural areas of operation to more urban areas of
Italy. New urban avenues of revenue for the Sicilian mafia included protection rackets for fishing
fleets, garages, and construction projects.34 The crews that managed these protection rackets
steadily evolved into assassination squads, burglary crews, and extortion specialists.35 One major
difference between the Sicilian mafia and the other two “honored societies” was the tight
hierarchical structure that the Sicilian mafia utilized to better control their criminal territories and
members. As seen below, the Sicilian mafia had a fairly straightforward, almost militaristic,
command structure:
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36

The control of the entire organization clearly rested with boss, as everyone in the organization
reported up to him. This structure allowed different crews to be compartmentalized and operate
independently of one another— a highly successful technique which allowed the Sicilian mafia
to continue illicit operations during periods of internal instability or overwhelming law
enforcement pressures.37
While the Sicilian mafia provided a structure that benefited future bosses of the American
mafia, the Camorra, a centuries-old crime group based in southern Italy, provided a structure
that better suited lower-tier members during internal conflicts.38 Compared to the Sicilian
mafia’s hierarchical structure, the Naples-based Camorra had a more spread-out structure in
which different clans only sporadically worked with each other. As a result, individual Camorra
clans were able to operate independently of one another, but also feuded among themselves more
than other Mala Vita groups. Their structure, however, enabled the Camorra to be more resilient
if their leaders were killed or arrested.39 Furthermore, one of the Camorra’s methods similar to
that of the Sicilian mafia achieved respectable social standing through cultivating political
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sponsorship.40 Setting a successful precedent for later leaders of the American mafia, heads of
Camorra clans became favored confidants and speakers for local public officials due to their
power within their respective communities. Through a combination of overwhelming violence,
shrewd political power, and social leadership, the Camorra clans transformed themselves into
intermediaries between their neighborhood community and Italian politicians at the national
level.41 Strengthened by their local and national political connections, members of the Camorra
clans offered protection privileges to their Neapolitan political friends since they possessed both
the political power and violent means which allowed them to act as they saw fit against both the
citizenry and local law authorities in their communities.42 Decades after the Camorra had
established itself as a political and criminal force, leaders of the American Cosa Nostra
acknowledged the Camorra’s power and courted political power in a similar manner.43 As waves
of Italians immigrated to America in search of a better life, so did Mala Vita members who were
fleeing anti-mafia persecution and seeking fertile ground for continuing criminal enterprises.
Coming to America: The Rise of the American Mafia
The American mafia might have its roots in Sicilian culture, but in its early decades in the
United States it adapted to American society and took on a distinctively American character.44
Hopeful incoming Italian immigrants were met by hostile American attitudes defined by antiCatholic and anti-radical prejudices as well as a strain of radical nativism— a tradition
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characterized by the belief that the United States belonged to the Anglo-Saxon “race.” 45 These
negative characteristics developed into full-fledged xenophobia in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, as thousands of Italians entered the United States seeking a better life for
themselves and their families. Emigrants out of Sicily in 1895 numbered around 100,000 with an
increase to 127,000 a year by 1906.46 Out of these many emigrants, the vast majority sought only
peaceful and successful lives outside of their native country. But the sheer number of immigrants
in 1890s America caused revulsion and panic among groups of northern and western European
descent. The supply of workers surpassed the demand for laborers. In turn, this increased
unemployment in cities and created a competitive work environment where anger manifested
against the newest waves of immigrants.47 Furthermore, Italian and Sicilian immigrants to
America unintentionally carried over the customs and mores that had defined their lives in their
former villages and cities.48 The combination of American anti-Catholic, anti-alien, and radical
nativist feelings contrasted with the old-country traditions of Italian and Sicilian immigrants and
formed a tense situation in the late nineteenth century. Despite this class tension, urban areas
with swelling groups of immigrants, like the city of New Orleans in the late 1880s and early
1890s, remained areas in which Italian immigrants began to thrive.
Even before the Civil War, many Italian and Sicilian immigrants sought out New Orleans
as a preferred location owing to its familiar climate, expanding economic opportunities, and
Roman Catholic traditions. As one newspaper wrote about the increase in Italian immigrants to
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the city, “Italians have turned their attention to New Orleans and the Gulf region… finding here
an interior sea, another Mediterranean, furnishing every possibly facility for their maritime
operations in fish and fruits. Here they find a culture which is well suited to their people from the
rural districts.”49 Building upon their work experience from their home countries, Sicilians and
Italians sought jobs similar to those they had held across the Atlantic. Though many waterfronts
were controlled by Irish and black workers, Sicilians managed to acquire jobs as fishermen,
longshoremen, and dock workers. Additionally, numerous southern Italian immigrants found
work as fruit and vegetable salesmen or as merchants and importers who worked closely with
familiar faces of workers at the docks.50 With nearly 250,000 citizens in 1890, New Orleans
placed as the 12th largest city in America, and certain patterns that existed among immigrants in
other major cities certainly applied to Italian and Sicilian immigrants in this southern urban
center.51 Both groups endured discrimination yet were free to travel throughout the city without
fear of assault or molestation. Italians and Sicilians certainly lived near others with similar ethnic
backgrounds, yet these groups were not confined to specific sections of New Orleans, but were
scattered sporadically throughout the city. Importantly, several Italian immigrant families in New
Orleans in the late 1880s and early 1890s had amassed substantial fortunes, a fact which suggests
that though discrimination against Italians and Sicilians existed in the city, it did not affect the
ability for these immigrants to work their way into wealth.52 However, the assimilation of the
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Italian and Sicilian immigrants into life in New Orleans faced sudden disruption in October 1890
after the murder of New Orleans police superintendent, Chief David Hennessey.53
In the months leading up to his death, Chief Hennessey had been investigating the
activities of the New Orleans-based Matranga crime group, with particular focus on the
enormously wealthy Italian immigrant Joseph P. Macheca. Hennessey believed that Macheca
held a leading role in directing criminal schemes within New Orleans.54 On October 15, 1890,
several assailants wielding shotguns shot and killed Hennessey as he was walking home.
Immediately, Mayor Joe Shakespeare ordered a roundup of all people suspected of participating
in the brazen murder. Nineteen men, all Italians, were arrested, and 13 of these men were placed
on trial in mid-February 1891.55 Before and during the trial, public fears of an underground
Italian criminal organization surfaced, and with the help of newspaper editorials and public
speeches by local politicians that fear soon grew into public rage. Within the courtroom, the
defendants’ attorneys were able to provide sufficient alibis for all their clients. Although the
defendants were cleared of all charges, a lynch-mob waiting outside the courthouse kidnapped
and murdered 11 of the 13 defendants in an act of extra-legal violence. This lynching was meant
to serve as a warning to other immigrants in New Orleans who might think about undertaking
criminal activity.56 As an example of how Italian immigrants were treated as “outsiders” to
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American culture and society, this trial and resulting lynching revealed the status of Italians in
American society in the late nineteenth century. The assassination of David Hennessey, a public
official, fostered American fears regarding the problem of urban immigrants and branded Italian
immigrants as “outsiders” to American culture.
Other urban centers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were filled with
dangers for new Italian immigrants. Cramped housing, unsanitary living conditions, and
dangerous jobs were all faced by early Italian immigrants in America. At the turn of the century
most immigrants in New York City lived in tenement houses.57 These narrow, small apartment
buildings were frequently overcrowded, cramped, poorly lit, under ventilated, and usually
without indoor plumbing. These conditions created centers of vermin and disease, which in turn
caused recurrent outbreaks of cholera, tuberculosis, and typhus.58 In New York, Italian
immigrants found themselves confined to a claustrophobic indoor existence, using the same
small room for eating, sleeping, and even working. Sometimes Italian-Americans’ work places
were just as perilous as their homes. Many southern Italian immigrants were qualified only for
unskilled, more hazardous, urban labor. These early immigrants worked on the growing city’s
municipal works projects, such as digging canals, laying paving and gas lines, building bridges,
and tunneling out the New York subway system. By 1890, nearly 90 percent of the laborers in
New York’s Department of Public Works were Italian immigrants.59 However, ItalianAmericans found work outside of these dangerous projects, turning to improvised trades like
street-cart vending, shoemaking, masonry, bartending, and barbering.
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Most of the Italian immigrants settled in the cities and established their own
communities. These communities allowed immigrants to speak their native language, enjoy
ethnic foods, and practice their customs and Catholic religion. In their neighborhoods, they
celebrated saints' feast days, with parades, music, and fireworks, as they had done back in Italy.
However, early Italian immigrants endured discrimination in America. Many were verbally
abused and called names such as “wop,” “guinea,” and “dago.” Despite the frequent harassment
they suffered, most Italian-Americans were lighthearted and generous. They dealt with
discrimination by focusing on their work and family. By laboring in American factories, building
roads, dams, tunnels, and other infrastructure, Italians carved out a small economic foothold in
American society. Their work allowed them to provide for their families and children, both of
which stood at the core of early Italian-American life.60
Although discrimination against Italians frequently hindered aspirations of many younger
Italian-Americans, Joseph Petrosino rose out of these conditions and became a legendary New
York police officer who blazed a trail for future Italian-American police officers. Giuseppe “Joe”
Petrosino was born in Padula, Italy on August 30, 1860. At the age of thirteen, he immigrated to
New York with his entire family.61 In New York, the Petrosino family lived in slums made
available by the municipality on Mulberry Street. Since Joe Petrosino was the eldest son, he
worked many jobs to assist his family. He worked as a shoe-shine in front of the Police
Headquarters on Mulberry Street. It was a job that allowed young Petrosino to meet many of the
officers who patrolled his neighborhood. By 1878, Petrosino had learned English, obtained
American citizenship, and submitted an application for enrollment in the New York Police
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Department. His application was rejected, but he received a job in the garbage sector, which
allowed him to work in the same building as the police. His knowledge of the Italian and English
languages soon became helpful to officers who valued him as both an informant and translator.
On October 19, 1883, Petrosino was finally enlisted in the New York police, and after a short
training as a patrol officer, he began to climb in the department, winning other officer’s
admiration for passion, instinct, and intelligence on the job.62 His work became so well-known
that he even earned the appreciation of Theodore Roosevelt, who became Police Commissioner
in 1895. Roosevelt personally promoted him to the rank of sergeant, and in 1905 Petrosino was
again promoted to lieutenant. With this promotion, he took the command of the “Italian Branch,”
a group of five Italian-American officers. In Petrosino’s judgment, an Italian unit was necessary
to fight the “Black Hand” and could simultaneously build better relations with Italian
communities throughout the city.63 In addition to his successful police work, Petrosino advised
city and law enforcement leaders on why Italian-American criminals preyed in urban areas,
citing minimal police presence, overcrowding, and discrimination.64 City leaders heeded his
advice, and by 1909 Petrosino commanded almost 30 Italian-American officers. Seeking to end
the flow of criminals coming from Italy and Sicily into the United States, Petrosino secretly went
to Palermo to investigate ties between American and Italian criminals. On his first day in the
city, Petrosino was gunned down by professional assassins who killed him with two shots to the
back of his head.65 While his murder was never solved, his diligent work against Black Hand
extortionists was celebrated by early Italian-Americans who were victims of this unique gang.
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Emerging to prey upon this class of “outsiders,” a group of extortion specialists named
the “Black Hand” exploited American nativist discrimination against Italian immigrants.
Between 1890 and 1920, an estimated four million Italian and Sicilian immigrants settled in
America, and out of that massive group, a very small number of immigrants—mostly from
Sicily—brought violent traditions, contempt for lawful authority, and talents for extortion that
would eventually enable them to create an atmosphere of terror throughout Italian-American
immigrant neighborhoods.66 As the most publicized early Italian criminals in America, the Black
Hand extortion rings preyed almost exclusively on a majority of their decent, hardworking
countrymen who had settled in America.67 Lax American law enforcement, combined with the
traditional code of omertà, attracted enterprising Sicilian bandits to enter America and begin
kidnap and extortion campaigns to make quick money.68 Even one of the most powerful
American mafia bosses, Charlie Luciano, endured the oppressive conduct of Black Hand
members, “We had real pros from the old country [referring to Black Hand extortion specialists].
We used to make fun of them behind their backs, but our parents were scared to death of them.”
Luciano’s words expose a lack of fear by young, Americanized Italians for Black Hand
members. As he later stated,
One time my mother received a big prosciutto ham from our family back in [Palermo].
While we were letting the ham air, so that it wouldn’t be too soft, a guy named Moliari
comes to collect a dollar from my father. He was a fat bastard who specialized in
Sicilians, and my Dad paid him once every other week. Anyway, Moliari comes up and
sees this big prosciutto ham, takes it down and starts walking out the front door. My
mother said something to him, and all he replied was, ‘you don’t want your girls growing
up all alone, do you?’ But I fixed that bastard good…about two months later we [burgled]
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his apartment and grabbed over $400. That was the most expensive prosciutto that
[explicative] ever stole.”69
Luciano’s story reveals several important points. Young Italian immigrants in America were not
afraid of organized criminals like the Black Hand, perhaps because these groups did not hold the
same power that other American gangs possessed. Additionally, Luciano’s retribution against
Moliari shows that even Black Hand members were subject to burglaries, just like any other
Italian immigrant. Maybe young Italian immigrants understood that America existed as a place
of equality in both opportunity and danger— a situation unique to the United States and radically
different from the areas of southern Italy from which their parents had recently departed.
As the most publicized Italian-American crime group in the United States, the Black
Hand soared in notoriety due to the jingoistic anti-immigrant feelings of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. The Black Hand was a direct carryover from late nineteenth century
Italy, with the group’s name issuing from their threatening letters always signed with a crude
outline of a black hand. In the aftermath of the Hennessey murder, many high-profile crimes
committed throughout American cities in the first two decades of the twentieth century were
incorrectly suggested to have been perpetrated by “bloodthirsty Italian criminals”— a convenient
benefit to other immigrant crime groups who operated more daringly because of this falsehood.70
Black Hand criminals did not contribute to the Italian-American culture or help law-abiding
Italian immigrants, but rather selfishly and frequently ran extortion schemes on their own people.
A typical extortion scheme for Black Hand operatives included an initial threatening note,
followed by several other terrifying notes if the initial tribute went unpaid. Subsequently, a close
family “friend” would approach the victims and offer their services in negotiating with the
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criminals. This “friend” was in fact an ally of the Black Hand criminals who would subtly
influence the family to pay the money while simultaneously keeping an eye on the victims to
make sure they did not contact the authorities. A typical Black Hand extortion scheme lasted
months, if not years— and usually ended in the victims’ murders or bankruptcy.71 These Black
Hand schemes only added to the numerous perils faced by Italian and Sicilian immigrants who
had come to America’s shores with bright hopes for better futures.
Early in the twentieth century, the Italian criminal organizations had more power than
their American counterparts, but the influx of Italian immigrants to America allowed Mala Vita
members who entered the United States to profit quickly from criminal activities never before
seen in North America. Some theories have developed about the origins of the American mafia.
A more inflammatory theory, supported by numerous early twentieth century newspaper
accounts, proposed that the American mafia was deliberated transplanted to America from
southern Italy in what appeared to be a “criminal invasion from the Boot [of Italy].”72 The milder
second theory argued that the “old Sicilian values of family and honor” met with the idea of
American individualism and capitalism then clashed with criminal results. In fact, American
society and Sicilian culture were not as vastly different as these theories would lead some to
believe— particularly shown by this paper’s early discussion about Italian and Sicilian
immigrants in New Orleans. Organized crime historian John Dickie argues that the members of
the Italian honored societies transplanted themselves into America’s economically dynamic
environment— an environment that was fertile for a slow creeping, but powerful crime system.73
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Though historians agree that there were older and more established American immigrant crime
groups, they did not possess the structure or hierarchy that the Italian criminals brought to the
United States.74 Irish, Italian, Jewish, and other immigrant gangs all held one characteristic in
common: they all faced discrimination by people and organizations that held older roots in
America.75 This discrimination created anger, resentment, and assisted some immigrants in
blatantly disregarding America’s laws. In addition to this discrimination, the southern Italian
code of omertà still held a significant place in the heart of many Italian-American immigrants.
Omertà was not simply a “code of silence,” but a “living discipline,” as the FBI termed it, which
Italians and Sicilians employed to deal with any form of government, European or American.76
The lack of acceptance and rampant discrimination by other Americans combined with the
inherent distrust of government authority created opportunities for early members of the
American mafia to commit barefaced crimes with little worry regarding legal repercussions or
witnesses who might report them.
While many Italian and Sicilian immigrants faced nativist discrimination, the most
powerful bosses of the American mafia and their Jewish compatriots worked to overcome their
status as American “outsiders” and become established in America.77 Charlie “Lucky” Luciano,
arguably the most powerful American mafia boss ever, vividly recalled being placed in second
grade as a ten year-old simply because he was not fluent in English. In Luciano’s own words,
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“As far as my mother and father were concerned, the best part of America was the free
schools. See back in Lercara Friddi [a neighborhood of Palermo, Sicily], we only had
Catholic schools that you had to pay to go to. But school for me was the worst time I ever
experienced. I didn’t know a damn word of English…and the old broads [teachers] had
nothing to teach me. Maybe that’s why I fought so hard to get outta school, out on the
streets where a lot of people spoke Sicilian-Italian and they knew what I was sayin’ and I
could understand them…it was these people that really taught me. I learned English on
the streets.”78
Similar situations occurred with famous gangsters such as Frank Costello, Vito Genovese and
Tommy Lucchese.79 Like Italians and Sicilians, Jews faced frequent discrimination due to their
immigrant status and religion. Though sometimes rivals or competitors, Jews and Italians also
banded together in an effort to achieve their dreams, legal or otherwise, in their new nation.80 As
Luciano stated regarding the discrimination Jews and Italian immigrants both faced, “some of the
discrimination helped unify us, and some even gave me [criminal] ideas for later down the
line…but it was always a struggle to be accepted.”81 One way Jewish and Italian immigrants
worked to get accepted into the broader American society was to learn English.82 Luciano stated
that his learning of English was crucial for two reasons— it allowed him to more fully integrate
into society and it allowed his multi-lingual gang to better communicate and plan prospective
crimes.83 Luciano professed that these occurrences of being separated from other children due to
his immigrant background and ethnic identity sparked the beginnings of tightly knit groups
which would later form street gangs and eventually the leadership corps of the American mafia.84
Historians disagree on how discrimination contributed to the overall recruitment of the
pre-World War I American mafia. Some argue that discrimination pushed Italian men to a life of
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crime, while others point out that almost all Italians emigrating to the United States endured
similar discrimination, yet only a few turned to a life of crime to escape it.85 Not only did early
American mafia members have to contend with discrimination, but also a lack of law
enforcement protecting their immigrant neighborhoods. This lack of protection from the
American government, combined with the nativist ideas of many American police officers,
forced Italian and Sicilian neighbors to work with their Jewish neighbors in an effort to protect
themselves in their new nation. Black Hand extortionists, the inability to communicate in
English, and pervasive American nativism all contributed to the hardships faced by the families
of early American mafia members. Passage of the Volstead Act, one of the most sweeping and
unpopular laws, created conditions for that to change.

85

Fox, Blood and Power, 139-141; Gosch and Hammer, Last Testament of Lucky Luciano, 53.

34

II. RISE OF THE AMERICAN MAFIA
Capitalizing on the opportunities provided by Prohibition, the American mafia’s activities
granted them legitimacy, popularity, and allowed them to start fitting into American culture,
especially socially and politically. After decades of nativist discrimination and living as
“outsiders” in America, the Prohibition era provided the opportunity for early American mafia
members to finally become accepted into American culture. Perceiving the public’s discontent
for the Volstead Act, ACN rumrunners and bootleggers multiplied their armies in an effort to
satisfy the usual law-abiding public’s demand for alcohol.1 This sudden anti-government, proalcohol movement of regular, ordinary Americans afforded an opportunity for the American
mafia to capitalize on public demand for booze. The early American mafia’s cooperation with
non-WASP bootlegging groups, particularly Jewish gangs, created some of the most successful
bootlegging operations of the Prohibition. The popularity, wealth, and political contacts gained
by the American mafia during Prohibition set the stage for its future in the American underworld.
Economic Ties to Prohibition
As the Prohibition movement gathered momentum and culminated in the ratification of
the 18th Amendment on January 16, 1919, many American citizens unreservedly scorned
government enforcement of the Volstead Act.2 The public’s admiration for violators of the
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Volstead Act, which went into effect on January 17, 1920, grew since these illegal actions were
considered good-natured sport, and not a harmful crime by most law-abiding Americans.3 The
Eighteenth Amendment passed through both the US Senate and House of Representatives, an act
that revealed a national anti-alcohol attitude. In the Senate, Democrats voted 36 in favor and 12
in opposition while Republicans voted 29 in favor and 8 in opposition. In the House, Democrats
voted 141 in favor and 64 in opposition while Republicans voted 137 in favor and 62 in
opposition.4 Many representatives from large urban cities opposed ratification on behalf of their
constituents, many of whom were recent Catholic immigrants from Europe.5 Although the
Eighteenth Amendment passed with support from more rural states, citizens in major cities
throughout the United States still viewed Prohibition with contempt and supported those who
broke its laws. The benevolent attitude the public held towards bootleggers— brought on by the
US government’s ban on alcohol— provided the American mafia an appetite for bootlegging that
would rake in massive profits for its members. American mafia leaders discovered that rumrunning was commonly seen as occupations which supplied essential products and service for the
public good, or at least satisfied the public desire.6 Although two-thirds of the states had ratified
Prohibition’s laws, opposing states’ reactions to the forced national Prohibition laws showed that
many high-ranking politicians, like their constituents, held Prohibition laws in contempt as they
perceived them as infringing upon America’s history.7

3

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mafia Monograph, Memorandum to Director, FBI 06/04/1958, Mafia in United
States, Section II, Bureau File Number 100-42303-330, electronic page 42-48 out of 115, found in the FBI Records:
The Vault, accessed November 3, 2013; Nelli, The Business of Crime, 148.
4
Richard F. Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth Amendment: Temperance Reform, Legal Culture, and the Polity, 18801920, (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 190-215.
5
Ibid, 190-215.
6
Gosch and Hammer, Last Testament of Lucky Luciano, 29; Nelli, Business of Crime, 148.
7
Gosch and Hammer, Last Testament of Lucky Luciano, 79-81.

36

For over two centuries alcohol and smuggling held a place in the history of America, but
during the Prohibition era these subjects seized US citizens’ attention as many observed the
government’s enforcement as tyrannical and unwelcome. Organized intellectual groups, such as
the Yale Club, purchased massive amounts of alcohol to “last them over a decade,” while the
lower class gambling clubs took to distilling “bathtub liquor” which they shared with neighbors
and friends alike.8 These and many other violations of Prohibition show how many problems the
enforcement of the anti-alcohol laws posed. Major enforcement problems included police
lethargy, congestion of the court systems at local and state levels, an unwillingness of states to
share enforcement duties with the federal government, widespread corruption at the local and
state levels, insufficient funds for enforcement of the Volstead Act, and overwhelming political
hypocrisy throughout all levels of government.9 However, Prohibition still remained the law of
the land, allowing entrepreneurial bootleggers the opportunity to satisfy their eager consumers’
wants through illegitimate means. After Prohibition was enacted, there were five means of
obtaining alcohol: receiving smuggled alcohol from organized crime syndicates, turning
industrial alcohol into drinkable liquor, home brewing, medical prescription, and by
strengthening the alcoholic content of “near beer” through various means.10
To meet the public’s demand for intoxicating liquors, the ACN viewed smuggling as the
surest path of getting liquor of high quality in a relatively safe manner. Alcohol was smuggled in
from Canada, Mexico, the West Indies, and Great Britain. Notable bootlegging boss Charlie
Luciano noted that, “[mafia] members couldn’t bring whiskey in from Scotland, Ireland and
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Britain fast enough... we literally would purchase as much as our boats could hold, and then in a
week be almost completely dry!”11 As the demand for alcohol soared, profits from American
mafia-controlled breweries reached previously unthinkable heights. A typical barrel of beer cost
less than five dollars to produce, but could be sold to an average speakeasy for $40. Whiskey and
other hard spirits had even better profit margins.12
Capitalizing on the ever-growing public support for anti-Prohibition smugglers, the actual
task of transporting illicit alcohol significantly stimulated illicit interstate commerce within and
outside of the United States. Though estimates are difficult to ascertain due to the illegitimate
nature of the business, maritime smuggling operations completed by the American mafia
considerably affected international and domestic commerce. Between 1918 and 1922, Canada
increased its importation of liquor from European distilleries almost six times, Mexico eight
times, and the West Indies almost five times.13 The US Department of Commerce issued highly
conservative estimates that the total value of liquor smuggled into America went from $20
million in 1922 to $52 million in 1924.14 Organizations like the American mafia used numerous
methods to smuggle alcohol to their consumers, including land-based and maritime smuggling
routes. Several histories of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) note that the American
public’s support for Prohibition might have influenced Coast Guard members and contributed to
the spirit of the Volstead Act being frequently and blatantly ignored by USCG sailors.15 Off duty
USCG seamen they were just as likely to indirectly support the American mafia’s alcohol
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industry as any other citizen.16 Smuggling liquor across the Detroit River from Canada was much
easier than open ocean smuggling for several reasons. For one, border cities in Canada could
store large amounts of alcohol for however long the smugglers needed, which allowed them to
outwait the overworked and understaffed law agencies enforcing Prohibition. Alcohol smuggling
became so lucrative around Detroit that only the automotive industry could compete with its
overall profits. The US-Canada smuggling operation in Detroit was estimated to have provided
over 50,000 jobs and had an annual output of over $215 million in 1928.17 Detroit was not the
only “smuggler’s paradise” within the United States since the entire northern border with Canada
was free game for mobsters and amateurs alike. Other areas around the Great Lakes served as
excellent outposts for smugglers not audacious enough for open-ocean smuggling from countries
overseas.
In efforts to evade US government enforcement agencies, liquor smuggled out of Britain
and Latin American was brought into the United States by ACN-hired seamen known
affectionately as “rum-runners.”18 Numerous former seamen from all around America joined in
the smuggling business seeing how profitable and publically supported the routes had become.
One of the most famous of these seamen smugglers was William McCoy, who supplied the “real
McCoy good spirits.”19 McCoy operated in the New England area as well as the Bahamas from
1920 till his arrest and conviction of violating the Volstead Act in 1925. Even the arrest of one of
the most innovative smugglers did not deter thousands of others from trying their hand against
the Coast Guard. Hundreds of radio stations located along the eastern seaboard and on beaches
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beside the Gulf of Mexico helped organize one of the largest maritime smuggling operations to
date. The smuggling vessels were guided and protected by radio operators who relied on three
components for secrecy and success— an ever changing radio code, frequent updates about
possible law enforcement and Coast Guard patrols from American mafia contacts, and an
extensive communications structure which helped relay information between radio stations.20
Coast Guardsmen still did their job in patrolling for maritime alcohol smugglers, but remained
skeptical about the nature of the work they were carrying out. One Coast Guardsmen stated with
no small irony, “None of us considered ourselves crusaders against the Great Rum Demon…
most of us were, on the other hand, on remarkably good terms with the Demon, having frolicked
with him the Seven Seas over.”21 The rapid accumulation of wealth earned from smuggling
liquor into America, in combination with the unceasing public demand and popular response to
bootleggers supplying them, raised the level of public respect for the American mafia and
allowed leaders like Luciano and Costello to make contacts with high-ranking political and law
enforcement officials.
Political and Social Ties to Prohibition
The political and law enforcement contacts that American mafia leaders created during
the Prohibition era paralleled the level of corruption that the Sicilian mafia encouraged in the old
country— a trait that benefitted both groups. As Luciano stated about receiving police and
political protection for his bootlegging enterprises during Prohibition,
“Look, I don’t just want one in ten precincts, I want them all. These [police and political]
‘big shots’ are the same guys we’ve got in our pockets already. They’re in our
speakeasies every night, drinking our best booze. It’s just a matter of how much…What
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difference does it matter if it costs us one million? We’ll be able to bring in more
[alcohol] with those guys on our side.”22
Scrutiny of Luciano’s statement shows that ACN leaders actively engaged with politicians and
police officials in an effort to protect their operations. Furthermore, these same government
officials were more than willing to work with the ACN as they depended on the organization to
supply their alcohol just like average citizens. ACN leaders keenly understood that friendship
and cooperation with government officials would increase both profits and the expansion of their
operations to the general public.
By mixing business with their social lives, American mafia leaders developed numerous
respectable friends, political or otherwise, who could help expand their bootlegging operations.23
ACN leader Frank Costello regularly appeared as an approachable businessman who socialized
at public events and remained a well-known, non-threatening face of the American mafia.24
Numerous respected people associated with “Lucky” Luciano at various events, including
ranking New York police officials, national politicians like Al Smith, actors and singers like
Jimmy Durante, and even powerful religious leaders.25 Luciano firmly believed that rubbing
elbows with high-class society members greatly assisted his organization, and to encourage these
contacts to approach him Luciano frequently threw parties at luxurious hotels and elegant
speakeasies in an effort to expand his power and add wealthy East Coast socialites to his
clientele list. Upon being asked by one of his enforcers why he was using American mafia funds
to finance some of these parties, Luciano insightfully responded, “When politicians, judges,
sports figures, screen stars and police commissioners come to shake my hand and introduce their
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wives and girlfriends to me...that is real power. They are coming to me, and therefore our
product must be making an impact in their lives.”26 Recollecting upon a day at the Polo Grounds,
Luciano stated the following about when he knew that he had developed substantial protective
contacts, “[For] the first time in my life, I felt like I had real power. That day some of the biggest
people in New York would come up to me and say hello, say thanks [for the booze or other
gifts].” Luciano’s prestige and power at social events even attracted top-level government
officials, when he noted, “[It] was a pretty big thing when Dick Enright, the police commissioner
of the whole city, came over to see how I was doing. And with him was his police chief Bill
Lahey…and why not? They were both on our payroll. Lots of politicians too…Jimmy Hines and
Al Marinelli from Tammany Hall, politicians from Brooklyn, Kenny Sutherland [later
Democratic leader in Brooklyn], and Republican bosses from [other] states.”27
While American rum-runners perhaps first saw the economic opportunities associated
with alcohol smuggling, the international community of seamen quickly caught on to Prohibition
prosperity. Between 1920 and 1928, America’s allies, including the British, French, and
Canadians gained enormous profits from breaking the laws of the United States to assist the
American mafia. By 1928, however, Britain and Canada had internationally declared their
support of America’s internal laws, and as such added to the existing laws prohibiting the sale
and transportation of alcohol to the United States.28 At this point international law clashed with
international business interests, especially since Charlie Luciano and Frank Costello held close
connections to distillery owners in Scotland, England, and other European countries in the early
1920s, although Luciano stated that these connections were not always the friendliest:
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“Once Prohibition started and the demand for Scotch in the United States soared, the
distillers [notably those in Glasgow and Canada] didn’t mind putting the squeeze on us
because they knew we were bootleggers and gangsters.”29
With each new enforcement measure by the USCG and other international law enforcement
agencies, Luciano and Costello provided more money to their rum-runners to help with
smuggling counter-measures. Agreements between Britain, France, Germany, Holland, Sweden,
Italy, and Panama attempted to stifle Luciano’s organization, but the American mafia and other
syndicates simply increased their investments for bigger, faster, and longer-range boats.30
Luciano’s organizational set-up, as well as his skill at corruption and high-level influence,
allowed his smuggling operations, especially his maritime routes, to succeed and flourish until
the 18th Amendment was repealed in 1933. Nevertheless, to stay on top of the New York
underworld, “Lucky” Luciano would have to live up to his moniker throughout the early 1930s
as internal conflicts in the Italian-American mafia flared and violence erupted.
Castellammarese War
Throughout the Prohibition era, the American mafia had transformed from a structure of
numerous territorial gangs that were governed by local leaders— a structure that, if centralized,
could reap enormous profits from the continuing windfall of Prohibition. One of the most
powerful local leaders of these American mafia gangs was the obese Giuseppe “Joe” Masseria,
who nicknamed himself “Joe the Boss,” becoming the first mafioso in America to title himself as
head of the organization.31 Joe Masseria, an immigrant from the southern Italian area of Calabria,
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held and gained territory in East Harlem during Prohibition through outright, sadistic violence
against his enemies and through his sharp ability to select talented lieutenants who helped
manage his ever growing illicit empire. Three of these recruits stood above the rest— Salvatore
“Charlie Luciano” Lucania, Gaetano “Tommy Three-Finger Brown” Lucchese, and Francesco
“Frank Costello” Castiglia. Rising in opposition to Joe Masseria in 1925 was Sicilian mafioso
Salvatore Maranzano. Maranzano entered America with permission from Sicilian mafia leader
Don Vito Ferro of Castellammarese del Golfo, with orders to seize control of American mafia
operations in the United States.32 In 1930, Maranzano starkly denied Masseria’s authority and
refused to pay a $10,000 tribute to “Joe the Boss,” urging the soldiers under his command not to
recognize Masseria as worthy of leadership.33 This act, further fueled by the old country
vendettas between the Sicilian mafia and Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta caused tensions to skyrocket
between Masseria and Maranzano’s Italian-American gangs. The stage had been set for a
showdown between New York’s two largest mafia clans, and this showdown would quickly
develop into one of the most violent mob wars in the history of America.
The struggle between Maranzano and Masseria’s groups, or the Castellammarese War as
it was called in the criminal underworld, revealed to the more Americanized mafia members that
old-world feuds of Italian and Sicilian crime groups could significantly damage business, cause
immense profit losses, and turn precious public support against their organization. Lasting from
February to November 1930, the Castellammarese War became more confusing as it progressed,
with individual mafiosi and entire clans shifting sides as Maranzano’s forces continually got the
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better of Masseria’s men.34 From the onset, Charlie Luciano had been against Joe Masseria’s
declaration of being the “top boss” in America. Luciano viewed the corpulent Masseria as a “fat
disgrace,” who would eventually have to be removed from the picture. Further enraging Luciano,
Masseria declared that he had “no use for [Luciano’s] ideas” of modernizing and streamlining
the international alcohol smuggling operation.35 Luciano’s contempt for the Castellammarese
War reflected the thoughts of other Americanized mafia members. These American-raised
members, who fought on both sides of the Castellammarese War, had endured nativist
discrimination and overcome it by attaining wealth and public respect during the early years of
Prohibition. This new generation viewed the conflict as a major, unnecessary disruption to the
profitable flow of alcohol and wealth.36 Luciano’s shrewd character and savvy business sense
allowed him to recognize that the Castellammarese War attracted the attention of uncorrupt law
enforcement officials while concurrently repulsing ordinary Americans— the main customers of
the American mafia’s bootlegging schemes. Luciano’s fear of additional law enforcement
pressures, compounded with the steady loss of support and money from regular, law-abiding
customers due to the well-publicized violence, encouraged his development of a plan to
assassinate Masseria and broker peace with Maranzano.37
In an effort to restore peace, secure bootlegging profits, and gain back public support,
Luciano sought out a meeting with Maranzano in which they planned the assassination of
Masseria and how best to end the Castellammarese War. According to Joe Bonanno, who served
as a war-time consigliere to Salvatore Maranzano, Luciano secretly met with Maranzano and

34

Maas, Valachi Papers, 83-105; David Critchley, The Origin of Organized Crime in America: The New York City
Mafia, 1891-1931 (New York: Routledge, 2009), 165-198; Raab, Five Families, 25-35.
35
Gosch and Hammer, Last Testament of Lucky Luciano, 65, 93.
36
Raab, Five Families, 28.
37
Gosch and Hammer, Last Testament of Lucky Luciano, 91-95.

45

offered to kill Masseria in exchange for Maranzano’s word that he would call off his assassins,
recognize Luciano as a boss of equal status, and ensure that peace would be restored
immediately.38 Maranzano agreed to the terms, and on April 15, 1931, Masseria was gunned
down in one of his favorite restaurants by unknown gunmen.39 In a bold move, Luciano was
actually present at the restaurant during and after the shooting, but when questioned by police
about his possible involvement he apologized and stated he had seen nothing because he was in
the “back of the restaurant, washing [his] hands.”40 Almost immediately, Maranzano declared
peace and ordered his men to overcome any grudges or vendettas they had against any other
American mafia member, stating:
“Whatever happened in the past is over. There is to be no ill feeling among us. If you lost
someone in this past war of ours, you must forgive and forget. If your own brother was
killed, don’t try to find out who did it to get even. If you do, you pay with your life.”41
This order starkly contrasted to the manner of vendettas in the Sicilian mafia which could
indicate that although Maranzano was an old-school practitioner of the mafia codes, he realized
that the post-war situation needed to be handled differently than it might have been in Sicily or
southern Italy. This order also highlighted a major difference between the members of the
Sicilian mafia and the American mafia: early American mafia members, particularly members
that were raised in America, had few problems accepting tough orders for peace from their
leaders because they understood that peace was more economically advantageous. It was not
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long, however, before the old mafia customs of secrecy and deception that had raised Maranzano
in Sicily reared up in America.
Forging a Future for the American Mafia
After unilaterally declaring peace for all the warring American mafia groups across the
United States, Salvatore Maranzano deliberately ignored the second part of the peace negotiated
with Luciano— that they would both recognize each other as bosses of equivalent status. Only a
couple of weeks after Masseria’s assassination, Maranzano invited every American mafia boss to
an event that Luciano derided as his “inauguration party.”42 Meeting at a small resort 70 miles
away from prying eyes in New York City, American mafia leaders discussed and debated the
future of their organization. Any debates were quickly ended with the appearance of Maranzano,
who proclaimed to the group that major restructuring would occur within the organization.
Laying out a system of order based on the Roman military chain of command, Maranzano
proclaimed himself the “capo di tutti capi,” or “boss of all bosses.”43 Maranzano declared that he
would govern this newly reformed group with total authority. Setting up a structure for
governing the men under his command, Salvatore employed the time-honored system used by
the Sicilian mafia, as seen below:
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Under this system, Maranzano would greatly limit his contact with the soldiers in his
organization and their associates, thus restricting the ability for law enforcement to tie the boss to
any of the hundreds of crimes that profited the group. Not only did Maranzano alter the previous
structure of the American mafia, he also instituted inviolable rules to govern the violent
criminals under his rule. These rules included the following:
1) No man must ever, under penalty of death, talk about the organization or the family of
which he is a member, not even in his own home.
2) Every man must obey, without question, the orders of the leader above him.
3) No man must ever strike another member, regardless of the provocation.
4) All grievances on that day, imagined or real, were to be forgiven and total amnesty
granted.
5) No man could covet another member’s business or wife.45
This code of conduct was established by Maranzano with the express intention of preventing any
future conflicts between members or families that might hurt or disrupt the illicit economic flow
of goods and services, and thus affect other families. Perhaps the most difficult rule to enforce
was the dissolving of grievances between members, many of whom had intense hatred of one
another.46 However, it was this rule that separated the American Cosa Nostra from the old-world
Sicilian mafia and allowed for greater prosperity. In acknowledgment of the success of
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Maranzano’s plan, mafia leaders from around America approached him after his speech,
congratulated him, and paid tribute as a way of acknowledging his new position as the boss of all
bosses.47 While most of the ACN leaders saw great potential under Maranzano’s control, several
lieutenants believed their own ambitions would be better served by devotion to Charlie Luciano,
who had not forgotten that Maranzano reneged on their agreement to be bosses of equal stature.
Maranzano’s power-hungry actions so soon after Masseria’s death angered Luciano, who
reevaluated Maranzano and classified him as the most potent threat to the American Cosa
Nostra’s success.48 Capitalizing on his intimate friendship with Tommy Lucchese, who was
Maranzano’s personal confidant, Luciano discovered that Maranzano had acted quicker than
anticipated to have Luciano killed by an Irish assassin, Vincent “Mad Dog” Coll.49 Immediately
reacting to the dangerous situation, Luciano allegedly arranged for a group of assassins, led by
Lucchese, to enter Maranzano’s import-export business on September 10, 1931 and murder
Salvatore Maranzano viciously with both knives and gunshots.50 Luciano claimed self-defense
when questioned about the murder by other mafia members.
The Castellammarese clan, incredibly, accepted Luciano’s story and decided that
Maranzano had been unable to adapt to the culture and tactics of the new, Americanized breed of
Cosa Nostra members. Even Joe Bonanno, Maranzano’s strongest supporter, was somewhat
relieved that his old boss, a man who could barely speak English and felt above his own soldiers,
was now deceased.51 Bonanno readily agreed to Luciano’s “path for peace,” and met with
Luciano and the heads of three other New York clans to once again discuss the future of the
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organization.52 The other three leaders were Vincent Mangano, Gaetano Gagliano, and Joe
Profaci, and it was at this meeting that the five families of the American Cosa Nostra in New
York City emerged. Later in 1931, most of the same American mafia leaders who had submitted
to Maranzano’s authority met in Chicago under the security of Al Capone, and listened while
Luciano laid out the foundations for the future of the American Cosa Nostra.53 Luciano believed
the organizational structure Maranzano had set up was practical, but he added the position of
consigliere to each boss’s inner circle. Each consigliere would be responsible for maintaining
peace internally for their family as well as working out disputes between other families, like the
more common practice of hiring middle managers in large legitimate businesses.54 Analysis of
this crucial position suggests that it emerged out of the ACN’s desire to maintain the peace and
not endure another damaging war. Therefore, each consigliere under their respective bosses had
the dual responsibility of guiding the boss in peacetime and mediating between other families
should any sense of conflict be detected. Luciano understood that the rules Maranzano had set
forth for the members would ensure lasting prosperity for each ACN family as well as the overall
organization, and it was this desire to maintain the peace and profits which led Luciano to take
steps that would ensure a successful future for the American Cosa Nostra.
Overcoming the nativist discrimination which had made them outsiders in early America,
seizing the bountiful opportunities to become insiders that Prohibition granted, and enduring the
violent Castellammarese War, Luciano and his Americanized friends toiled to safeguard their
organization from future threats by implementing a structure that was more modern, durable and
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better organized. Shrewdly anticipating that the wealth of the ACN might attract competitors or
law enforcement, Luciano, at a conference of mafia heads in Chicago in late 1931, resurrected
and fortified the core tradition of omertà. This ancient code now applied to every member of the
American Cosa Nostra, many of whom perceived the pragmatic value of this anti-government
custom of silence and secrecy.55 Insulating the ACN even further, Luciano proclaimed that only
full-blooded Italians or Sicilians could be “made-men” in the organization, meaning that only
men whose father and mother were from either Sicily or Italy could receive the full benefits of
membership. Furthermore, Luciano ordered the families of the Cosa Nostra to “freeze their
books [of membership]” and only add new members when older ones passed away. This ensured
that only the most loyal associates of the ACN would be granted membership into the
organization.56 In setting up these membership requirements, the ACN became nearly
impenetrable to undercover law enforcement and rival, non-Italian criminals.57 Although
Luciano undoubtedly set up and transmitted these rules to each mafia leader personally, many of
these safeguards were developed and suggested by Luciano’s consigliere Meyer Lanksy.
Speaking about Lansky’s assistance during the 1931 Chicago meeting, Luciano stated,
“Meyer Lansky understood the Italian brain almost better than I did. He could talk about
the best way to handle things, how to get my ideas out to a bunch of big shots who were
tired of living under one guy’s thumb. I used to tell Lansky that he may have had a
Jewish mother, but someplace he must’ve been wet-nursed by a Sicilian.”58
With Lansky’s help, Luciano made it clear to other bosses that the survival of the
combined national ACN organization outweighed the needs of any individual member or family,
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a decree he solidified with the creation of a governing body of the ACN, known as the
Commission. The Commission, which Luciano proposed to other mafia leaders, would act
similar to how a board of directors of a legitimate company would operate.59 By centralizing the
administration, greater plans could be made that would profit the ACN in the future. The
structure for the Commission further allowed the ACN leaders to employ a set of lower, middle,
and top level members who could monitor, coordinate, and plan for the activities of its many
operating units that affected the enterprise as a whole.60 This modern idea almost certainly was
the brainchild of Meyer Lansky who possessed enormous financial, mathematical, and business
acumen. Additionally, Lansky was well-read and likely observed that the benefits similar to
those of a controlling board of directors, which was increasingly popular throughout legitimate
businesses in both America and Europe, might serve well-serve Luciano’s organization.61 The
Commission, in Luciano’s view, would establish any future policies or codes of conduct for
ACN members, as well as serving as a crucial connection between ACN families across the
United States. Members of the Commission would be selected from the five major ACN families
in New York as well as representatives from Chicago and Buffalo.62 The creation of the
Commission also furthered Luciano’s wish to remain only an equal with the other ACN leaders,
as opposed to the old-world traditions of a single governing chief. Lucky’s refusal to even accept
tribute money from other ACN leaders flew in the face of old-country traditions, which Luciano
acknowledged when he stated,
“I told Al [Capone] that I didn’t need the money cause I had plenty. Besides, why should
he be paying anything to me when we’re all equals? Al said to me, ‘Don’t be a horse’s
ass Charlie. Maybe it’s alright to break down old traditions, but why do you have to break
59
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this kind of tradition?’ I told him that it ain’t a good thing if these guys feel like I’m a
boss… I don’t want that. There ain’t going to be no more gifts, no more envelopes,
nothing like that. I think I really made Capone sick saying that.”63
Luciano’s vision for the American mafia’s future, his implementation for a national
structure with the creation of the Commission, and his firm stance that he was on the same level
as any other boss won him the hearts of ACN members and their leaders. Lucky’s addition of
consiglieres assured each family’s leaders and members that their complaints would be
addressed and resolved. His reliance on Lansky’s keen insight and the resulting establishment of
the Commission guaranteed that any future conflicts between families would be handled quickly
and justly so as to avoid any loss of profits or diminishment of the public’s patronage. Luciano’s
encouragement of the code of omertà satisfied any remaining old-world members, and his
continuation of Maranzano’s hierarchical structure benefitted the younger, more Americanized
members. Armed with Luciano’s structure in the tumultuous 1930s, the American Cosa Nostra
members were prepared for the unforeseen changes that would remake American society,
economics, and politics.
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III. COSA NOSTRA ADAPTATION IN THE 1930s
This chapter examines the adjustments that the American Cosa Nostra made during the
Great Depression by analyzing its expansion into numerous new, illicit activities, the
effectiveness of its Commission, and its response to government officials who worked to
dismantle their organization. During the 1930s, the organization consolidated itself from a
discriminated group of outsiders to a powerful, stable, and wealthy association that wielded
significant power in American politics and society. After the repeal of Prohibition, the American
Cosa Nostra lost its main profitable business of bootlegging, but it adapted by expanding into or
taking over other illicit activities. While millions of Americans suffered in the 1930s due to
severe economic hardships caused by extreme unemployment, the American Cosa Nostra
survived the Great Depression and adapted to the changing times of the “Dirty Thirties” by
searching for new opportunities that would profit them.1 The adaptation of the American Cosa
Nostra in the post-Prohibition 1930s, through its varied illicit activities and increasing presence
throughout numerous industries, allowed the ACN to continue profiting in the Great Depression
era. As Luciano recalled,
“Even after Prohibition was dumped, I was running one of the biggest businesses in the
world. We was in a hundred different things, legit and [illicit]. If you add it all up, we—
and I mean guys all over the country— were doing business that was grossing at least a
couple billion dollars a year.”2
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Luciano’s words reflect the changes that the American Cosa Nostra endured in transforming
from a wealthy bootlegging group into a multi-billion dollar organization.
ACN Expansion during the Great Depression
The Great Depression devastated American cities and, as a result, harmed ACN activities.
Up to 13 million citizens suffered unemployment, and in 1932 over 30 million people belonged
to families with no consistent full-time wage earner. Industrial production fell by nearly 45%
between 1929 and 1932, while homebuilding dropped by 80% in the same time period.3
Unemployment climbed to 25 percent of the American population in the worst days of 1932-33,
but the lack of jobs was disproportionately concentrated. Job losses were less severe among
workers in industries such as food and clothing, services and sales, and government agencies.4
As a result of unemployment and increasing public displeasure with the Volstead Act, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt supported the passage of the 21st Amendment in December 1933, which
repealed the 18th Amendment, resurrected “John Barleycorn,” and ended the thirteen year dry
spell that had so greatly assisted the Cosa Nostra in America.5
Partially due to the excellent structure set up by Luciano and his Jewish consigliere
Meyer Lanksy, American mafia members adjusted to Prohibition’s repeal while simultaneously
making strides to diversify their criminal activities and enter new areas of crime so as to stay

President Franklin Roosevelt’s Economic Council, Letter to the President on the Overproduction of Goods,
Unequal Distribution of Wealth, High Unemployment, and Massive Poverty, dated March 10, 1933.
4
Barbara Blumberg, New Deal and the Unemployed: The View from New York City (Lehigh: Associated University
Press, 1979), 7-23; Michael D. Bordo, Claudia Dale Goldin, and Eugene Nelson White, eds., The Defining Moment:
The Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth Century, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1998), 1-23.
5
New York Times, “Federal Agents to Prevent ‘Wet’ Wake for John Barleycorn,” January 15, 1920; David E.
Kyvig, Repealing National Prohibition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 160-183.
3

55

profitable during the Great Depression.6 As Luciano noted about the Great Depression’s effects
on the American Cosa Nostra,
“One day everybody was buying cases of booze…the next day they didn’t have enough
[money] to buy a pint. Every angle of our business was hit like a tornado. Pennies
became the backbone of our dollars, our bread and butter. See the little guy who got hit
by the times would still want to put a few pennies [in a gambling scheme], praying that
he’d hit something, not a big bundle, just something. With everything else, we took a
bath along with the other losers…And we knew that when [the public] didn’t have
anything else, they’re going to want a drink, and that drink better be legal or else they’ll
be trouble!”7
The American Cosa Nostra quickly transitioned from simple liquor production, smuggling, and
distribution into crimes that would become the bedrock of their organization: loan-sharking,
industrial extortion, gambling, prostitution, narcotics trafficking, cargo hijackings, robberies, and
gambling.8 Some of these new criminal activities had previously been the purview of Jewish
gangs, especially the industrial extortion schemes, neighborhood gambling operations, and loansharking.9 ACN members shifted to criminal activities that were either new and untested or
engaged in time-honored crimes that just simply had not been profitable enough during the
Prohibition bonanza. One example of a crime frequently used by racketeers in the 1930s was that
of loan-sharking.10 The lack of functioning banks and normal sources of credit during the Great
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Depression meant that ordinary citizens seeking loans had to turn to ACN members to help them
with both legitimate and secretive financial trouble. The advantage of asking any American
mafia member for a loan was that it was a quick cash source and they did not ask questions.11
ACN money helped gamblers pay debts, kept businesses from going bankrupt, and fulfilled other
needs. The reasons did not matter to the ACN members, some of whom charged unfavorable
interest rates which frequently caused the compounded interest to exceed the amount of the
original loan.12 A large number of recipients of ACN’s loans were gamblers who participated in
the mafia’s sizable gambling operations.
The ACN fostered the growth of a gambling empire which evolved from nickel, dime,
and quarter bets into a national betting syndicate that relied on nationwide wire services to bring
results into bookmaking parlors across the country.13 The ACN controlled gambling at numerous
racetracks, casinos, and throughout neighborhoods, frequently with the assistance of Jewish
immigrant gangs.14 Many of these cross-ethnic cooperative relationships emerged from 1920s
bootlegging schemes and transitioned into friendly criminal enterprises after the repeal of the
Volstead Act in 1933.15 Collaboration between ethnic gangsters allowed both groups’ lowertiered members to profit during the difficult times of the Great Depression. The most popular
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gambling activity overseen by the American mafia was the “policy game.”16 The game focused
on guessing the correct numbers generated from supposedly incorruptible sources— such as the
final closing number of the stock market or first number from the total daily intake at a race
track— and the gamblers would place bets on what they felt the random number would turn out
to be. The odds for the winner was 600 to 1, even though the real odds were 1,000 to 1. This
difference guaranteed phenomenal profits for the ACN members operating the policy game.17
This game, as well as other gambling activities, targeted desperate people during the Great
Depression who were willing to lose a few pennies in the hopes of hitting the big time.18
Members of the ACN acknowledged the hardships of the Great Depression for average
Americans and responded by frequently choosing criminal activities that would enrich them
without unnecessarily hurting their victims. Mafia members engaged in non-violent crimes, a
decision aimed at maintaining the public’s general support which had been so beneficial during
Prohibition.19 Loan-sharking, gambling, and extortion of wealthy businesses were viewed by the
public as relatively harmless. Speaking about his role as a friendly loan-shark, Luciano noted, “I
wanted to prove to my Wall Street and socialite friends that even a gangster had a heart and was
willing to help a friend out of a spot.”20 As learned during Prohibition, ACN leaders understood
that sustaining the public’s appreciation would maintain the American mafia’s customer base.
Luciano noted that he “loaned lots of [his respectable friends] whatever they needed, and
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charged them [at lower interest rates], like a bank, at maybe two or three percent. Some never
even repaid, but I usually just shrugged it off.”21 While it is certain that other ACN members did
not simply shrug off their loan losses like Luciano, many Cosa Nostra members did deliberately
lower their extortion rates, not out of the generosity of their hearts, but rather to protect their
long-term investments in the struggling businesses.22 As the FBI noted about loansharking in
their Mafia Monograph, “the inability of certain people, including longshoremen, to acquire
loans from regular loan companies or banks, perhaps due to intermittent employment, [allows the
ACN] to profit up to $80,000 a week [through loans].”23 By dropping their interest rates, ACN
members understood that they would still receive some money, and that with higher rates it
would be less likely to profit at all. Additionally, many of the ACN leaders saw no point in
crushing small businesses when they relied on larger criminal activities to supplement their
income.24 These larger operations typically focused on industrial rackets which were a source of
massive wealth for American Cosa Nostra families.
Diversifying American Mafia Activities
Some major money-making industrial rackets that the ACN created during the Great
Depression included controlling the Fulton Fish Market, extorting New York’s waterfront
businesses, and infiltrating unions which had been strengthened by New Deal legislation.25
Through the well-balanced application of force and intimidation, the ACN developed the ability
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to control unions, particularly those that involved waterfront laborers. Many of these waterfront
workers had either worked with ACN members in bootlegging operations or owed money to
ACN loan-sharks.26 The top ACN waterfront specialists were Joseph “Socks” Lanza and Albert
Anastasia.27 These men received millions of dollars in tribute from “every dealer, big and small,
retailer or wholesaler” along New York’s waterfronts. Lanza’s influence on the fish market,
which had started in 1923, was so great that his actions could change the price of fish throughout
New York and much of the nation.28 Lanza’s racket was well-known to the leaders of the ACN
who saw his lucrative $20 million dollar a year scheme as vital to the organization’s overall
profits.29 Similar to Lanza, Albert Anastasia sustained a stranglehold over the International
Longshoreman’s Association (ILA) on the New York waterfront. In addition to the ILA suffering
rampant corruption due to the influence of Anastasia, the New York waterfronts were bombarded
by an assortment of rackets including loan-sharking, organized theft of goods from docked ships,
kickbacks from employers in return for guarantees that daily work would be done, forgery of
union books, and pervasive fraud relating to other work matters.30 However, waterfront unions
were not the only ones to be controlled by the ACN.
The ACN exploited government legislation, particularly New Deal laws governing
unions, in order to profit and expand their power into numerous sectors of labor. The National
Labor Relations Act of 1935 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 allowed unions to grow

26

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mafia Monograph, Memorandum to Director, FBI 06/04/1958, Mafia in United
States, Section II, Bureau File Number 100-42303-330, electronic pages 74-75 out of 115, found in the FBI Records:
The Vault, accessed November 3, 2013.
27
Ibid, 74-75; Fred D. Pasley, Muscling In (New York, 1931), 160-180.
28
New York State Crime Commission, Fourth Report (Albany, 1953), 30-40; Martin Gosch and Richard Hammer,
Last Testament of Lucky Luciano, 263-265; Sifakis, Mafia Encyclopedia, 254-255, 335.
29
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mafia Monograph, Memorandum to Director, FBI 06/04/1958, Mafia in United
States, Section II, Bureau File Number 100-42303-330, electronic pages 72-73 out of 115, found in the FBI Records:
The Vault, accessed November 3, 2013; Nelli, Business of Crime, 246-250.
30
Nelli, Business of Crime, 245-250. Nelli’s information regarding this matter comes from his confidential sources
in the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

60

rapidly and empowered them to organize. The New Deal transformed conditions of work,
eradicating “labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standards of living
necessary for health, efficiency, and well-being of workers,” and gave many immigrant union
members new powers and rights.31 These immigrant workers, who had entered the United States
in the face of the anti-alien prejudices, found the New Deal union legislation beneficial in how
they were treated by their bosses and by other non-immigrant workers.32 However, as part of the
same immigrant group, the ACN perceived the opportunity to move in and takeover profitable
and powerful unions through the use or threat of force.33 Infamous union takeovers by the
American Cosa Nostra included the International Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees,
the Motion Picture Operators, and the Painters, Carpenters and Electrical Workers union, as well
as other construction and food service sectors.34 The FBI reported that the “[American] mafia has
exerted noxious influence in the labor movement… [through] labor counseling and [helping]
employers avoid difficulties with labor unions.”35 The ACN’s infiltration into unions was likely
due to the large number of immigrants and children of immigrants who worked in these unions.
The control of the unions served as a way for the American mafia to generate income and build
power throughout urban areas.36 The power that New Deal legislation gave to these unions only
increased the power of the ACN members who controlled them.
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In addition to union tampering and waterfront activities, the American Cosa Nostra
diversified their activities into the realm of industrial extortion and monopolization of products,
both of which profited the ACN after the repeal of the Volstead Act. One of the earliest entrances
of the Cosa Nostra into industrial rackets occurred when ACN leaders moved virtually
unchallenged to take over the Jewish Garment Center.37 As the FBI reported about the ACN’s
movement into the garment industry, “the garment industry has been heavily invaded by
racketeers in both New York and Pennsylvania.”38 The American Cosa Nostra’s takeover of this
industry was achieved through the extension of offers of protection to Jewish mobsters in return
for complete control of their rackets.39 Notable Cosa Nostra leader Tommy “Three-Finger
Brown” Lucchese eliminated Jewish gangsters who controlled the kosher chicken businesses in
New York, forcing agreements between the live-chicken suppliers, wholesalers, and slaughtering
companies, and establishing a cartel to control the price, distribution, and competition within the
entire marketplace of kosher-chickens.40 This model of monopolizing an entire market— from
production to sales— would emerge later in the history of the ACN as a frequent practice.
Monopoly of the market was attractive to ACN members because it granted the ability to
increase illicit profits while concurrently insulating the criminals behind layers of seemingly
legitimate agreements. By controlling the production, distribution, and sales of numerous
products, the Cosa Nostra raked in millions of dollars a month for each family.41 The Cosa
Nostra members’ involvement in these schemes also allowed them to interact with both workers
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and customers who were possible patrons for mafia-backed loans or illegal gambling operations
run by the Cosa Nostra. While these diverse rackets greatly benefitted the ACN during the Great
Depression, their activities were noticed and scrutinized by both criminal competitors and
government officials in New York.
After overcoming the difficulties of the Great Depression and expanding their activities
beyond the profitable bootlegging of Prohibition, the American Cosa Nostra began to face potent
threats to their organization from both criminal and law enforcement elements which would lead
to changes for the ACN. One of the earliest and most potent threats to the American mafia was
Irish gangster Oweny Madden. Oweny Madden’s violent upbringing in Hell’s Kitchen, his
startling business acumen, and his ownership of over two dozen nightclubs allowed him to
flourish as a Prohibition era celebrity-gangster and assisted in his cultivation of politicians from
New York City Hall.42 Due to his Irish background, Madden held powerful political friends
during the Prohibition— as such, the Cosa Nostra respected Madden’s territory and did not
challenge his bootlegging operations. However, with the repeal of Prohibition, Madden’s power
declined and he realized he could not compete with the Cosa Nostra, their Jewish compatriots,
and their ingenious post-Prohibition rackets. Madden eventually moved to Hot Springs,
Arkansas, where the corrupt police force and loose laws allowed him to become the illegal
gambling head of the entire state.43 With Madden’s departure, the Cosa Nostra’s favorable
relations with Jewish gangs matured as they continued their gambling and industrial rackets. As
George Wolf, a Jewish lawyer who represented both Cosa Nostra and Jewish gangsters in the
1930s and 40s, commented, “Jewish and Italian organized crime groups have always worked in
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surprisingly good harmony due to the Italians’ respect for the Jewish business sense, and the
Jewish nature to stay behind the scenes and let the Italians use muscle if it is needed.”44
Unfortunately for both groups, their powerful underworld relationship could not stop the
downfall of one of the forefathers of the mutually beneficial Jewish-Italian relationship.
Government Targets the ACN
Although the ACN had overcome the criminal threat posed by Madden, state government
officials had begun an aggressive campaign against New York City racketeers, a campaign led
by an ambitious young lawyer named Thomas Dewey and backed by Italian New York City
mayor Fiorello La Guardia.45 Emerging out of a complicated political situation in New York,
New York Governor Herbert Lehman appointed federal prosecutor Thomas E. Dewey to
investigate allegations of racketeering throughout the state. Fiorello H. La Guardia’s surprising
1933 mayoral win defeated the Tammany Hall political machine and continued Lehman’s
campaign against criminal corruption aimed at taking down major racketeering leaders in New
York City.46 La Guardia loathed Italian gangsters, whom he believed gave the entire Italian
immigrant community a bad name. One of his first acts as mayor was the quick destruction of
numerous gambling parlors throughout the city in order to “run the bums out of town.”47 With La
Guardia’s support, Dewey had full discretion on how to address the racketeering problem found
in New York. Dewey held a law degree from Columbia University, had obtained three years of
experience in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Manhattan, and possessed a unique talent for
recalling minute details of crimes while cross-examining witnesses on the stand, a trait that
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allowed him to transform into an effective hostile interrogator within the confines of courtroom
conventions.48 Dewey differed from other prosecutors by seeking out new cases and actively
gathering evidence from snitches as well as exploiting the lack of restrictions on the use of phone
taps by New York prosecutors.49 Furthermore, Dewey realized that before his crusade on
organized crime could begin, the existing laws regarding prosecuting criminals had to undergo
drastic changes. In an unorthodox move, Dewey convinced the New York state legislature in
1935 to permit “joinder” indictment that authorized single trials for defendants charged with
multiple crimes.50 Armed with this new legal weapon, as well as the information he was
receiving from snitches and unrestricted wiretaps, Dewey began pursuing prominent racketeers
whose operations were based in New York. A leading Jewish gangster and associate of several
ACN leaders, Arnold Flegenheimer— better known as Dutch Schultz— became Dewey’s first
target.51
Dutch Schultz was an interesting character whose story reveals the complexity between
the ACN’s Commission and Jewish gangsters during the Great Depression. Schultz’s criminal
success had been founded on bootlegging and alcohol distribution, but by the mid-1930s his
criminal activities had spread to controlling restaurant unions and running lucrative policy games
based in African-American and Hispanic neighborhoods. Exceeding his savvy business sense,
Schultz’s violent personality was known and greatly feared throughout New York’s vast criminal
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underworld.52 Schultz killed friends with little-to-no remorse while simultaneously priding
himself on creating new and terrifying ways to murder his enemies in an effort to enlarge and
solidify his reputation as one of the most violent gangsters in New York City. Although his
bloodthirsty tactics worked on members of the underworld, Schultz’s ruthless actions and cold
persona infuriated Dewey, who quickly convened a grand jury to seek an indictment for Schultz.
Fearing Dewey’s tenacity as a prosecutor, Schultz sought to curry favor from Lucky Luciano
whom he incorrectly believed could protect him from Dewey’s onslaught. Going so far as to
convert to Catholicism, Schultz hoped that Luciano would be able to use his political
connections to influence Dewey into looking at other underworld chieftains.53 This hope for
ACN protection was based on Schultz’s belief that Lucky still held the high-level friends in law
enforcement and politics that he had enjoyed during Prohibition. Schultz’s reasoning did not take
into account the shifting political landscape of New York, the changing leadership of law
enforcement organizations, and most importantly the tenacity that both La Guardia and Dewey
possessed in going after racketeers.54 Though Luciano doubtlessly still held numerous political
and law enforcement contacts, the overwhelming actions of Dewey and La Guardia rendered
them mostly ineffective. Upon realizing the ACN could not influence Dewey away from Schultz,
Dutch resorted to his violent tendencies and began plotting to assassinate Dewey.55 Though
Dewey was protected with assigned bodyguards, Schultz became increasingly focused on taking
out the young prosecutor before any damage could be done to either Schultz or his organization.
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Finally, Schultz crafted a plan to kill Dewey and asked for help from ACN gunman Albert
Anastasia, a notorious assassin who held a close relationship to Luciano.56
The American Cosa Nostra Commission’s dual decision to reject Schultz’s plan to
assassinate Dewey and instead kill Schultz reveals that ACN leaders understood the larger
political danger of assassinating a government official and proceeded to safeguard their
organization from additional government action and public reprisals. In short, the assassination
of Dewey would bring down too much anger and harassment on ACN families throughout the
country. Upon being informed by Anastasia of Schultz’s plan to kill Dewey, Luciano
immediately called a meeting of the Commission to assess whether Dewey’s death would benefit
or harm the Cosa Nostra’s interests. Luciano spoke about the meeting stating,
“This meeting had to be secret…not a word of it could get back to Dutch. You got to
remember that Schultz had a lot of friends in our outfit and this was the first time since
Maranzano was rubbed out that we had to face up to a unanimous decision of this kind.
The Commission was either going to work or the whole thing could fall apart right then
and there. Everybody had a right to talk, and everybody wanted to talk. But the vote was
strictly Sicilian. Lansky made that point very clear, reminding everyone, including me,
that each person had only one vote, period.”57
It is interesting to note that Lanksy, and apparently other unnamed Jewish gangsters were present
at this meeting, yet they deferred to the judgment of only the Sicilian members, perhaps simply
out of respect or possibly because they understood that one of their own had placed their entire
empire at risk with the foolish assassination plot.
The ACN Commission universally voted against Schultz’s assassination plan, arguing
that it was selfish, that Dewey’s death would destroy public tolerance for American mafia
activities throughout the city, and that the opportunities for money and power granted by New
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Deal legislation would be endangered.58 This decision by the Commission was further articulated
to proclaim that all incorruptible law-enforcement officials and investigators, also known by the
Cosa Nostra as “straight shooters,” were to be exempt from underworld violence or revenge by
any members or associates of the Cosa Nostra.59 This proclamation greatly differed from the
Sicilian mafia, due to the fact that Americanized mafia leaders knew that killing a righteous law
official would cause their organization to be persecuted and viciously attacked, unlike in Sicily
where the mafia operated as a protector from corrupt ruling governments.60 Arguably, the New
Deal played a small part in this decision as well. The Commission probably recognized that New
Deal reforms had greatly enriched state governments and disrupting these potential opportunities
by assassinating one government official would be economically imprudent. Although they did
not allow the murder of Dewey to occur, the Commission agreed to assassinate Schultz. This
decision by the Commission made it clear to the entire underworld that no attempts on the lives
of upright lawmen, attempts that would cause massive disruptions in ACN activities and profits,
would be tolerated. Additionally, the Commission, on the suggestion of Lanksy, suggested to
Anastasia that he should contract Schultz’s murder out to Jewish assassins, so as not to overly
offend other Jewish gangs.61 By having Jewish gangsters murder Schultz, Italian-Jewish
underworld relations could remain peaceful and profitable, certainly more profitable for Luciano,
who took over Schultz’s policy games and extortion operations after his death.62 While Luciano
financially benefitted in the short run, he had made a grave error in underestimating Dewey’s
determination to prosecute any and all racketeers in New York City. As Luciano wrote about this

58

Ibid, 186-188.
Ibid, 186-188; Raab, Five Families, 48.
60
Gosch and Hammer, Last Testament of Lucky Luciano, 186-188; Servadio, Mafioso, 7-14.
61
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Files Pertaining to Arthur Flegenheimer, AKA Dutch Schultz, Bureau File
Number 23-2130, found in the FBI Records: The Vault, accessed March 20, 2015; Gosch and Hammer, Last
Testament of Lucky Luciano, 186-188; Raab, Five Families, 49.
62
Maas, Valachi Papers, 149-150; Raab, Five Families, 49.
59

68

time, “I was not a Boss of Bosses in all this, but a guy a lot of people came to for advice, a guy
everybody expected to be in on big decisions. But there was [just too much going on] for me to
know what was going on all the time.”63
With Dutch Schultz’s sudden and violent death, Dewey and his men redoubled their
efforts and focused on investigating Luciano and the ACN. Despite the fact that there were
several other ostentatious mobsters Dewey could go after, his team had become aware of
Luciano’s importance in the underworld by learning of his lavish lifestyle in the penthouse in the
Waldorf-Astoria Hotel.64 Upon realizing that Lucky’s steep personal expenses warranted a
deeper look, Dewey’s crack team of investigators began probing into Luciano and his top
“industrial racketeer” lieutenants. In a disappointing revelation, Dewey discovered that Luciano
was a difficult target to ensnare. He actively guarded his speech on the telephone to protect
against wiretaps as well as defending himself from incriminating monetary evidence by keeping
all financial records in his head.65 In a remarkable turn of fate however, the first and only
African-American woman on Dewey’s team, Eunice Carter, suggested that Dewey look into
corruption cases dealing with prostitution throughout the city.66 Though at first Dewey was wary
of the public response to scrutinizing “fallen women,” his unrestricted phone-taps revealed an
organization called “the Combination” that held control of over 300 brothels throughout
Manhattan and Brooklyn.67 Quickly hoping to capitalize on this information, Dewey and his
team raided numerous brothels in an attempt to arrest and “turn” prostitutes and managers alike
against Luciano. Frightening suspects with long jail times and excessively high bails for those
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who did not cooperate, Dewey’s team went all out in their attempt to ensnare Luciano and other
Cosa Nostra members.68
The New Deal, which greatly expanded government at federal, state, and municipal
levels simultaneously provided large opportunities and great risk to the American Cosa Nostra.
The government’s choice of Dewey as Luciano’s prosecutor was one of the greatest risks to the
ACN’s leadership in the 1930s. Dewey doggedly pursued after Luciano when he fled to Oweny
Madden’s town of Hot Springs, Arkansas, a move that declared Luciano’s guilt more than
anything else. Acting on an extradition order for Luciano’s presence in court, Dewey’s detectives
stealthily kidnapped Luciano from Arkansas and returned him to stand trial in New York.69 In
May of 1936, Luciano and twelve codefendants, many of whom were Cosa Nostra members or
associates, stood accused in front Dewey. Pulling out the boldest legal tactics he had ever used,
Dewey proceeded to use testimony almost exclusively from prostitutes to portray Luciano and
his organization as a group who preyed on women and exploited their desperate situations.70 His
most damning witness against Luciano was a prostitute named Cokey Flo Brown, an admitted
heroin addict, who provided ostensibly fact-checked testimony about Luciano’s connection to the
network of brothels throughout the city as well as his relationship to numerous “managers” or
“pimps” throughout New York City.71 Though Luciano vehemently denied ever meeting Brown,
Dewey magnificently depicted Brown as a luckless woman whose fate to work as a prostitute
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was certain because of the cruelty of her employers, most notably Luciano. Testifying at trial,
Brown stated,
“Luciano had said to me that he was ‘going to organize the cathouses like the A&P’…To
keep us in line, [Luciano] would say ‘Talking won’t do any good…You got to put the
screws on and step on them.”72
As the trial waged on, Luciano’s lawyers made the final, fatal mistake of allowing Luciano to go
on the stand, thereby opening him up to cross-examination by Dewey. During several hours of
brutal questioning by Dewey, Luciano’s credibility was destroyed in the eyes of the judge and
jury.73 Even Luciano later admitted to lying under oath, stating,
“Sure I lied up there on the stand. What else could I do? It was their word against mine,
and if I ever admitted that I knew them, nobody would ever hear anything else I had to
say. After the first guy was done, I saw that little bastard Dewey get out of his chair and
walk towards me. At that second, I was more scared than I ever had been in my whole
life.”74
After the public courtroom interrogation of Luciano, in which Dewey ceaselessly grilled Luciano
and pointed out the numerous times he lied, it was little surprise that both the judge and jury did
not sympathize with the defense. Dewey noted that Luciano’s testimony was,
“A shocking, disgusting display of sanctimonious perjury—at the end of which I am sure
not one of you had any doubt that before you stood not a gambler, not a bookmaker, but
the greatest gangster in America.”75
Perhaps the most damaging information Dewey exposed about Luciano was his voluntary
assistance to law enforcement after his 1923 narcotics arrest. This fact, revealed by Dewey,
publicized to the other American Cosa Nostra leaders that Luciano had violated their solemn
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code of omertà.76 After the brutal cross-examination of Luciano, Dewey and the State rested
their case and waited for the jury’s decision. Only nine hours after closing statements, Luciano’s
sentence was handed down— an incredibly stiff prison sentence ranging between 30-50 years. A
year later, Luciano’s appeal was turned down, although convincing evidence had emerged that
the three main witnesses against the defense had perjured themselves.77 ACN members were
stunned that Luciano had been convicted on trumped up charges of conspiracy and aiding
prostitution and that his sentence was extraordinarily harsh. As Joe Valachi recalls about the
incident, “I was stunned. Charlie Lucky wasn’t a pimp. He was a boss.”78
While Dewey’s successful prosecution of Luciano launched his political career, leading
to appointment as District Attorney of New York City, later Governor of New York, and
Republican nominee for President in 1944 and 1948, it also revealed that the opportunities
provided to the ACN through the government’s New Deal programs also brought substantial
risks. Thanks to the restructuring of the ACN in 1931, Luciano’s 1936 conviction did not
drastically alter the successes of the American mafia throughout the rest of the Great Depression.
However, his arrest, trial, and conviction did demonstrate to ACN members that the government
had developed resources committed to dismantling their organization. And though the sheer
breadth of ACN’s activities and profits was beyond the ability of any District Attorney, Dewey’s
tenacity and victory over Luciano proved to the American mafia that incorruptible government
officials still posed a threat.79 Although Dewey had won a major battle against racketeers, the
war still raged on. But the war between the American Cosa Nostra and law enforcement would
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be put on hold, and Dewey’s relationship with Luciano and his men would suddenly become
vital to America’s security, as the United States entered World War II.80
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IV. ALL-AMERICAN COSA NOSTRA
This chapter explores the American mafia’s secretive relationship with the US
government from the origins of World War II in 1941 through the 1957 Apalachin conference.
Through examining formerly classified military and government documents, ACN leaders’ own
testimonies, newspaper descriptions, and evidence provided by credible, low-level ACN
members, the ACN’s actions show their intent to capitalize on opportunities generated by
wartime and to adapt to post-war American life. Wartime efforts, especially government
enforced rationing, created conditions which the ACN exploited. In addition to these domestic
wartime activities, ACN members overseas developed contacts with Axis government officials in
Italy in an effort to profit abroad. After the war, ACN members reverted back to previous
activities that had profited them in the 1930s, only to find that the prosperity of post-war
America greatly increased their wealth throughout urban centers. At the end of the decade, the
ACN’s 1957 Apalachin conference revealed to ordinary Americans that a national criminal
organization existed, and it was this revelation which eventually led to the downfall of the
American mafia.
American Mafia at Home in World War II
While the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor angered many ACN members, it was
also observed as having potential for criminal activities which might profit mafia members

74

throughout the US.1 On December 7, 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy attacked the US Naval
base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, killing over 2,400 Americans and injuring hundreds more.2 The
following day, President Franklin Roosevelt addressed Congress, famously calling December 7
“a date which will live in infamy,” and asking for a Congressional declaration of war against the
Empire of Japan.3 The American Cosa Nostra perceived how the war could be an exploitable
situation, but debated on how best to profit from it. By spring of 1942, wartime rationing began
to affect civilian populations on the home-front and numerous shortages developed in the
economy, requiring the regulation of certain goods and governmental control of pricing.4
Seeking to capitalize on these changes in the American economy, the ACN turned its focus to
controlling the black market.5
Though not quite the windfall that Prohibition had provided, similar conditions were
present for the ACN to exploit. The government’s action to ration goods created the market for
illegal sales of commodities to a public that was a willing, even anxious accomplice. The
establishment of the Office of Price Administration (OPA) and its early declaration that
“Americans [were] going to experience drastic changes in their living habits,” frightened large
swathes of the American public who enjoyed consumer comforts.6 Though many Americans
during this time were patriotic and did indeed “do without” in order to assist soldiers overseas, a
large number of Americans actively worked to undercut the government’s rationing system. To
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do so, they turned to the ACN, who were known experts in obtaining restricted commodities and
undermining government authority.7 Since the restricted wartime goods were common items like
meat, gas, and sugar, they posed little danger to ACN members who transported and sold them
on the black market.8 Due to the benign nature of these products, the public assisted the ACN in
raking in enormous, tax-free profits with minimal risk. One successful procurer of these harmless
yet illicit goods was low-level ACN member Joseph Valachi. As Valachi recalls, “I specialized
in gas ration stamps. From mid-1942 until 1945 I made about $200,000, but I wasn’t so big.”9
The illegal gasoline-ration operation, on the other hand, was massive. The OPA estimated that
2,500,000 gallons of gasoline were being diverted to illegal markets every day.10 Extrapolating
from this fact, nearly 3.2 billion gallons of gas were diverted from the American war-effort just
within the United States. This large-scale diversion of goods, particularly gasoline, was part of a
carefully structured operation largely facilitated by ACN members and their associates.
Legitimate rations stamps were obtained by breaking into local offices of the Office of Price
Administration, though Valachi noted that actual ACN members did not participate in these
burglaries but instead relied on younger gangs to take the risks.11 In turn, the ACN would
purchase the stamps from these younger associates and resell them throughout the underworld
and to legitimate companies like gas stations.12 This position as a middle man between the actual
thieves and the consumers placed the ACN in the enviable position of financially benefiting from
the crime without assuming too much risk.
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Minimized risk was only one of the benefits that being a member of the ACN in wartime
allowed. Membership also guaranteed prompt payments from customers, reasonable prices for
the stolen stamps and, most importantly, it allowed the ACN members to maintain the tension
between supply and demand for many rationed goods. As Joe Valachi stated regarding the
selling of wartime ration stamps,
“The big dealers of [the stamps,] like Carlo Gambino and Big Sam Accardi, controlled
the market. They did not sell to everybody. The idea was to keep enough tension between
supply and demand to keep the stamps moving steadily at the best possible price. To stay
on top of things, these big shots would advise me how much I should charge [a customer]
for stamps and how many I can sell him. That way they hold the price and we all
benefit…If you want to know how we got rid of the stamps, it was mostly to the garages.
Boy, they were glad to get them. They needed stamps to cover all the gas they were
selling without [the OPA’s] permission. It was the best business I was ever in.”13
Wartime membership in the American Cosa Nostra had several advantages that greatly assisted
even the lowest members. The stamps for any rationed product were guaranteed to be noncounterfeit, decreasing the risk for ACN members even more than if they were caught with fake
stamps. Furthermore average Americans continued associating with mafia members in return for
favors, loans, and purchases of rationed goods.14 Additionally, the mafia’s previous activities like
gambling, extortion, union tampering, and control of the waterfront all continued under the
protection of the well-structured organization. However, it was the control of the waterfront that
would greatly benefit ACN leaders, particularly Lucky Luciano.
Collaboration between the American Mafia and ONI
In the early months of World War II, the United States faced a grave national emergency
regarding the destruction of American ships in the Atlantic and increased fears of sabotage in
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ports and harbors.15 Naval intelligence officers, responding to the suspiciously nativist perceived
threat of pro-Mussolini saboteurs on the shores of the homeland, laid out numerous options for
safeguarding the ports and docks where valuable war materials were stored to be transported
overseas by newly repaired ships. One such ship was the USS Lafayette, previously a French
vessel named the SS Normandie. On February 9, 1942, the Lafayette caught fire at Pier 88 on the
edge of the Hudson River, and within 12 hours the fire had capsized the ship while it was still in
port.16 Newspapers speculated that the event could have been caused by sabotage or poor
security and procedures at the docks.17 Taking these accusations seriously, the Office of Naval
Intelligence (ONI) examined its options for ensuring the total security of New York waterfronts
and harbors up and down the East Coast.
The American Cosa Nostra had influence on the docks through connections from
Prohibition smuggling operations and Great Depression union contacts. In March of 1942, ONI
District Intelligence Officer Captain Roscoe MacFall, supported by Lieutenant Commander
Charles Haffenden, conceived and initiated a plan to use persons with underworld associations as
instruments of Naval Intelligence in an effort to protect the waterfront from German or Italian
saboteurs.18 Seeking assistance from New District Attorney Frank Hogan and Colonel Murray
Gurfein, Chief of the District Attorney’s Rackets Bureau, ONI officers sought information
regarding the most powerful waterfront racketeering bosses. Not surprisingly, American mafia
member Joseph “Socks” Lanza’s name topped the DA’s list since his control of the New York
waterfront was unparalleled, an accomplishment that was recognized in both the underworld and
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select circles of the government. Lanza was contacted through his attorney and upon meeting
with the waterfront ruler, Captain MacFall was informed that, in the opinion of Socks Lanza,
Charlie Luciano would be the best man to contact regarding securing the docks against
saboteurs.19 As the Herlands’ Report states,
“Lanza’s opinion was that Luciano had a great deal of influence and power in the circles
that could mobilize underworld personalities and their network of contacts to help Naval
Intelligence.”20
Lanza’s proposition that the ONI employ Luciano, who had no previous experience working on
or around the docks, suggests a deep level of ACN strategic planning in regards to manipulating
the US government.
While the official story of the mafia’s assistance to Naval Intelligence seems legitimate
on the surface, it is Luciano and Lansky’s own words which reveal the opportunistic nature of
the ACN and its leaders. Their story of the Lafayette fire suggests more manipulated connections
between MacFall and Luciano. Luciano stated that Lansky and he formed the idea of getting out
of prison after seeing newspapers describing the Navy’s obsession with protecting the
waterfronts against sabotage.21 As Luciano recollects,
“Lansky started to smile. He said to me, ‘Charlie I see what you’re getting at. It’s
brilliant. How can Dewey turn down a patriotic hero? I think we can handle all the angles
cause we’ve got a lot of guys down [at the waterfront] with the Navy guys.’ So I told him
that, first, there had to be something that would deal with sabotage and it had to be frontpage stuff that would make it necessary for the Navy to come to us for help.”22
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Luciano and Lansky’s plan clearly revolved around an incident that would force the Navy to
seek help from the ACN or some of their contacts on the waterfront. Following up on this plan,
Luciano stated, “It was a great idea and I didn’t figure it was really going to hurt the war effort
because the ship was nowhere near ready and, besides, no American soldiers or sailors would be
involved because they weren’t sending them no place yet. So I sent Albert [Anastasia] to handle
it.” Though some historians doubted the veracity of Luciano’s claims, almost 15 years later
Meyer Lanksy corroborated the above statements when he explained, “I told [Anastasia,] face to
face, that he mustn’t burn any more ships. He was sorry— not that he had burned the Normandie,
but sorry he couldn’t get at the Navy again. Apparently, he believed the Navy to be a bunch of
‘stuck-up bastards,’ as he called them.”23 The ACN leader’s meticulous planning of this alleged
operation, and its resulting success, reveals several important points about the American mafia
during World War II. For one, Albert Anastasia, known for his power on the waterfront, was the
right person to execute Luciano and Lansky’s plot. With his contacts in the International
Longshoremen’s Association and the backing of experienced ACN members, Anastasia’s
implementation of the suspicious fire went off soundly enough to convince the ONI that drastic
measures were needed to protect the docks. This plan, a conception of both Luciano and Lansky,
further illustrated the tight, continuing relationship between the Italian and Jewish gangs. Finally,
this plan and its execution fundamentally revealed the power that Luciano still wielded from
prison. After only a few meetings and with the consent of fellow ACN leader Frank Costello,
Luciano was able to order a massive sabotage operation from hundreds of miles away. This
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power transcended neighborhood or even city-wide criminal organizations— it was a power
which, at that time, belonged exclusively the American Cosa Nostra.
Though the Lafayette disaster was engineered and carried out by leaders of the ACN, the
Office of Naval Intelligence still received support and assistance from numerous members in the
American mafia. Soon after the meeting between MacFall, Haffenden, Luciano, and Lansky, Lt.
Commander Haffenden was placed in charge of “Section F” which conducted investigations in
the field of sabotage, counter-espionage, and other related matters. He also headed the “B-3”
unit, which was tasked with collecting strategic intelligence about possible target and invasion
areas. To accomplish both of these tasks, Haffenden turned to Luciano and Lanza. Haffenden
outlined a plan of action which involved the enlisting of underworld networks as a means of
obtaining information for counter-intelligence use and the protection and prevention of
espionage and sabotage.24 Haffenden also requested the transfer of Luciano from Clinton Prison
in Dannemora to Great Meadow Prison in Comstock. The transfer, it was argued, would allow
Luciano to better communicate to the essential waterfront contacts who could ensure security for
the naval war effort.25 Visitors to Luciano’s new quarters included Lansky, Lanza, Polakoff,
Costello, and Joe Adonis— all of whom held the ability to use Luciano’s name in an effort to
more efficiently provide security for the docks. Furthermore, as the Herlands’ Report states,
Luciano assisted in “making a network of contacts and informants available to Naval
Intelligence.”26 These contacts could “obtain information and report suspicious activities… [as
well as] act as lookouts for sabotage and espionage.”27 Thanks to their dealings with unions and
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waterfront workers during the 1930s, ACN members could “obtain union books and union cards
so that Naval Intelligence agents could be placed (ostensibly as employees) in hotels, restaurants,
bars, grills, piers, docks, trucks, factories and elsewhere.”28 These contacts, listed out in a
government report, were willingly given over to ONI personnel, an unthinkable action in the oldworld. Not only did the ACN leaders order waterfront workers to assist the ONI with their
concerns, but they encouraged
“Italians of Sicilian birth or background [to give] information to Commander Haffenden
about the terrain, harbors, etc., of Sicily in anticipation of the Allied landings there.
Through these contacts and informants, the names of friendly Sicilian natives and even
underworld and Sicilian mafia personalities were obtained and used in the actual Sicilian
campaign.”29
While the ACN’s contacts and their information proved to be “about 40% valuable” to the
Sicilian campaign, the truth is the Allies won the battle for Sicily through remarkable logistical
organization and poor decisions from the Axis powers.30 However, the motives for the ACN
leaders assisting the ONI remain suspicious and certainly fly in the face of any real meaning of
omertà. It could be argued that the abandonment of omertà during wartime was a calculated
move to achieve the end goal of freeing Luciano, the unspoken ruler of the ACN, from prison. If
so, the plan backfired as Luciano’s pardon, given by his old enemy and then-current New York
Governor Thomas Dewey, was conditional upon his immediate deportation to Italy due to his
birth in Italy and his incomplete citizenship application.31
American Mafia Overseas
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The power of the American Cosa Nostra reached overseas during World War II,
influencing fascist government officials in Italy and expanding their activities into profitable,
new geographic areas. This expansion was best illustrated in the story of Vito Genovese and his
activities in Italy from 1937 through 1945. Genovese originally left the United States fleeing a
murder charge for the killing of fellow ACN associate Ferdinand Boccia, and he entered Italy to
settle near Naples with over $750,000.32 During his time in Italy, Genovese built up contacts
throughout Mussolini’s Fascist government, even becoming close with Il Duce himself.
Supposedly, Genovese gained Mussolini’s trust when he ordered the death of a radical antiMussolini man who was living in New York.33 Genovese trafficked narcotics throughout Italy,
even allegedly supplying Mussolini’s own son-in-law with cocaine.34 At the start of World War
II, Genovese sided with Mussolini’s strong government, assisting their war effort and in return
gaining access to military goods, services and favors. Luciano angrily recalls notes from
Genovese,
“When war started, Vito didn’t have to live in a country that was an enemy of the United
States; there was plenty of safe place for a guy with all his money. But he was just rotten
greedy. Vito’s whole life was junk [drugs]. He sent [fellow ACN boss] Steve Maggadino
a letter saying that he had worked out a new way to transport the [drugs] because the
Americans took over North Africa and screwed up his route. And he was mad about it,
that his own country was beginning to beat the Nazis.”35
Luciano’s anger at Genovese’s lack of patriotism seems at first to be hypocritical considering his
own involvement with the Lafayette arson, but deeper analysis reveals that Luciano was more
upset that Vito had not planned on the Allies winning Italy back from Mussolini. Vito’s sudden
predicament was resolved by Luciano, who stated,
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“Vito was beginning to feel the pinch between the Americans making their way into Italy
and his friend Mussolini and all that crowd running like hell out of Rome. I made sure
that Vito ended up on his feet in Italy with the Allies there…As it happened, the Army
appointed [former New York Lieutenant Governor] Charlie Poletti, who was one of our
good friends, as the military governor in Italy and Poletti kept that job for quite a long
time…he even made Vito the official Italian-American interpreter.”36
The fact that ACN leaders had influence over the US military governor of Italy during World
War II testified to the organization’s ability to corrupt and manipulate all areas of government.
Vito Genovese’s return to the United States revealed the fearful power the Cosa Nostra
now wielded throughout post-war America. On August 27, 1944, Sergeant Orange C. Dickey of
the US Army Criminal Investigation Division arrested “Don Vito Genovese,” who was suspected
of heading up a black market ring which had been stealing Italian and American supplies.37
Found on Vito’s person was an intriguing pile of permits from high-level American officers
extolling his virtues and granting him uninhibited travel throughout all of Italy. These permits
even referenced his work as the official Italian-American interpreter— a job Genovese underling
Joe Valachi described as beneficial because it allowed Genovese to eliminate any other black
market or narcotics competition through giving “tips” to the Allied forces.38 Standing up to
enormous pressure from his military superiors, Sergeant Dickey held Genovese in jail from
August 1944 through January 1945 while he waited for more information on this mysterious and
well-connected prisoner. Finally in December 1944, Dickey received orders to bring Genovese
home to stand trial for the 1934 murder of Boccia.39 The true power of the American Cosa
Nostra reared up only a week before Vito’s return to the United States when one witness to the
Boccia slaying was suspiciously poisoned while in protective custody. The remaining witness
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against Genovese quickly withdrew from the public spotlight and refused to testify.40 This
incident began to perpetuate the myth that testifying against the any American mafia member
meant certain death. This myth, and others, led to the belief that the ACN was untouchable in the
post-war period.
Post-War American Mafia
The end of World War II terminated the black market rationing schemes which had
greatly profited the ACN, but by this time the American mafia had achieved acceptance into
American society and once again adapted their activities to profit from the post-war prosperity of
America. After World War II had finished, the American public perceived that the actions and
heroism of Italian-American soldiers deserved respect. This post-war respect transformed Italian
communities from immigrant outsiders into accepted American citizens who were afforded the
full rights of first-class citizens. In addition to this overarching acceptance into American culture
and society, ACN activities and profits increased as the economic prosperity of the post-war
period gained momentum. The FBI noted that the post-war American mafia had controlled
gambling throughout the United States, especially in cities like Tampa, New York, Detroit, and
even Havana, Cuba. Loan-sharking and extortion practices remained prevalent activities for
ACN members, and the increase in post-war production and industry greatly benefitted
American mafia members involved the industrial rackets.41 Furthermore, narcotics trafficking
had increased both domestically and internationally. The FBI even went so far as to state that
“there exists a realm of cooperation and coordination between [mafia members] in the United
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States and the Mafia in Italy in the illicit traffic of drugs.”42 Though the FBI’s connection
between the Sicilian mafia and the ACN was based largely on circumstantial evidence, the threat
of a larger drug trafficking operation which might have expanded out of Genovese’s activities in
World War II Italy certainly seemed plausible. Narcotics trafficking, which had been viewed
unfavorably by ACN leaders in the past, gained traction with ACN members who discovered the
quick and overwhelming wealth it could bring.43 Joe Valachi mused on the crime of narcotics
trafficking stating that with good partners, an American mafia member would be successful in
the drug business, but with dishonest partners, the risks would increase greatly and typically
profits would fall.44 The opportunities to gain wealth from these post-war activities created
competition and envy amongst ACN member, leading to disloyalty within the ACN and violence
that captured the attention of US investigatory agencies.
Although the late 1940s and early 1950s existed as a financial “golden era” for the ACN,
the American mafia was less concerned about profiting off of the government and more
concerned with government investigations, internal violence arising from competition, and
assassination attempts on its leaders. The Kefauver Hearings of 1950-51, which was a Senate
investigation into crime that harmed interstate commerce, troubled leaders of the ACN since it
was the first nationally publicized investigation into organized crime.45 Brought on by the
numerous newspaper and local government reports detail crime and corruption throughout states
in the American Northeast, the Kefauver investigation into the ACN’s interstate activities
worried many ACN leaders who hoped that the inquiry would not negatively affect the
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organization’s widespread activities.46 While the investigation captured America’s attention due
to its dissemination to the public through television and newspaper, the Senate Committee failed
to produce prosecutable evidence against any of the suspected ACN members brought in to
testify. This failure led Congress, the FBI, and other law-enforcement agencies to dismiss the
threat posed by the ACN for the time and instead focus more on the threat of communism within
the United States.47 Although the immediate threat from the US government had passed, power
struggles within the American mafia endangered the organization’s profits and activities.
The problems within the ACN’s leadership corps during the 1950s were influenced by
three factors: Luciano’s deportation to Italy, Frank Costello’s more subtle leadership style, and
the ambition of Vito Genovese. On the evening of May 2, 1957, an unidentified man shot at
Frank Costello after shouting, “This one is for you, Frank.”48 The bullet only grazed Frank’s
scalp, but its effect sent shockwaves through the American Cosa Nostra. After Luciano’s
deportation to Italy in 1946, Costello had become the undeclared ruler of the ACN.49 Luciano,
upon hearing of the attempt on his friend’s life knew it could only have been the ambitious work
of Vito Genovese. Speaking about his reaction to the news of Costello’s shooting, Luciano
exclaimed,
“I was so [explicative] pissed that if I could travel on my passport, I’d have been on the
next [explicative] plane to the States to straighten out that little bastard Vito…And then I
heard that Vito had put a contract on me. So I had to get in his head and think of how he
would do it. And it hits me that he knows I love cars and motors and stuff, so I started
looking for bombs and making sure I wasn’t being followed.”50
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Genovese’s bold tactics somewhat paid off in the sense that Costello quietly retired so as to
avoid a war.51 But Genovese’s ambitious plan to be “Boss of Bosses” went ahead on October 25,
1957, when Albert Anastasia was murdered in a barber’s chair at the behest of Genovese and his
new allies Joe Profaci and Carlo Gambino.52 With this sudden spree of attempts and outright
murders, many ACN members feared another war, like the 1930 Castellammarese war, between
ACN factions due to Genovese’s bold and unsanctioned violent actions.53 Genovese, sensing the
danger his activities had brought, suggested organizing a meeting in the small New York hamlet
of Apalachin so that grievances could be aired, ACN business could be handled, and important
issues, such as the ACN’s involvement in the narcotics trade, could be settled once and for all.54
The revelation that a national crime syndicate indeed existed infuriated the American
public and forced government representatives to begin long-term investigations against the
American mafia. On November 14, 1957, in a quaint, upstate New York town of Apalachin,
police stumbled upon a gathering of more than 60 well-known gangsters from around the
country.55 ACN leaders at this conference included Frank DeSimone from Los Angeles, James
Civello from Dallas, James Colletti from Colorado, Louis Trafficante from Florida, Frank Zito
from downstate Illinois, Joseph Zerilli from Detroit, James Lanza from San Francisco, Joseph
Ida from Philadelphia, John Scalish from Cleveland, Joe Bonanno from Arizona, and the leaders
of the New York ACN families.56 The sheer spread of these men and their influence across the
United States shocked urban and rural citizens alike. Though the ACN were well-known in urban

51

Ibid, 390.
Ibid, 382.
53
Ibid, 399-405.
54
Toledo Blade, “Narcotic Traffic Called Topic in Apalachin Talks,” February 28, 1960; Maas, Valachi Papers,
261.
55
New York Times, “US Inquiry on Apalachin Grows,” January 10, 1958; New York Times, “Luciano Disclaims
Links to Apalachin,” July 25, 1958.
56
Maas, Valachi Papers, 265.
52

88

areas due to their operations in major cities since the late nineteenth century, both urban and
rural Americans were astounded and petrified by the scope of the ACN’s power. The spawning
geographic locations of the leaders arrested in Apalachin exposed to both citizens and
government officials that a national criminal organization operated within the borders of
America and that it was not just urban areas that were affected by its activities. The fear garnered
by this revelation fostered increased scrutiny of the men at Apalachin as well as their associates
in their home cities.57 In the aftermath of the raid, the government could no longer tacitly support
the Mafia’s existence or argue that Italian-American crime gangs operated only on a local level.
Federal and state law enforcement agencies took steps to gather information on the American
Cosa Nostra. These efforts, combined with the broader American public’s reaction to the
existence of an organized crime outfit within the United States instigated the eventual downfall
of the American Cosa Nostra.
The ACN’s wartime and post-war activities— their wartime collaboration with
government agencies, their involvement in the rationed-goods black market, their expansion into
broader criminal ventures after the war, and their struggle against government investigations and
internal power struggles— all transformed the organization from the late 1940s through the
1950s. The ACN’s relationship with the Office of Naval Intelligence eschewed the old-world
code of omertà so as to benefit leaders of the American mafia. The post-war period of prosperity,
especially with the ACN’s expansion into more diverse criminal activities, set the stage for a
bountiful future for the organization. However, this same prosperous period possessed elements
of the problems which would plague the American mafia in the future— power struggles within
the ACN’s leadership, the increase in narcotics trafficking, and the loss of secrecy surrounding
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the organization. The exposure of the ACN to the American public at the Apalachin conference
initiated federal and state investigations which would eventually led to the downfall of the
American mafia. The American mafia’s involvement with narcotics brought additional
government scrutiny and lost the ACN public support which it had enjoyed during Prohibition,
the Great Depression and even during World War II. Finally, the greed and ambition of rising
bosses, especially Vito Genovese, disgusted ACN members who viewed his actions as
threatening to the organization as a whole. These factors of greed, narcotics and public distrust,
combined with the investigative ability of the FBI, ultimately diminished the role of the
American mafia in the US underworld and opened the doors for newer immigrant organized
crime groups to fill in the sizeable gap left by the American Cosa Nostra.
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V. CONCLUSION
The transformation of the American Cosa Nostra from a despised immigrant class of
outsiders in the late 19th century to a fully integrated group of consummate insiders with power
in social and economic matters could not have occurred without unwitting assistance from the
US government. The gathering of immigrant gangs would not have been possible without
popular American nativism, US policies regarding immigrants, or the constant discrimination
which united these immigrants together in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The deliberate
and conscientious actions by American mafia leaders to navigate the changing American
landscape emerged from changes in American law during the 1920s Prohibition era, was
bolstered by New Deal legislation which strengthened unions, and was continued into World
War II as ACN members actively worked side-by-side with government agents both at home and
abroad.
Adaptations by the ACN in response to government decisions were the result of careful
efforts by American mafia leaders who Americanized their organization and its activities. This
Americanization process required the ACN to break away from old-world traditions and
practices, particularly the code of omertà. By breaking with this anti-government code of
conduct, the ACN differentiated from its Mala Vita forebears who had exploited the long-term
weaknesses of the Italian government. American nativism of the 1890s and 1900s revealed to
early ACN leaders that they were in a class of unwanted persons and, to rise out of this group,
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they would need to provide services to respectable Americans and build up wealth to counter the
daily discrimination they faced.
The growth of the American mafia during the Prohibition era allowed this
Americanization to begin as the ACN capitalized on the unpopular laws. By supplying alcohol to
both wealthy, respectable Americans and average citizens, the American mafia undermined the
government’s laws while simultaneously removing themselves from the discriminated immigrant
class. As the American mafia transformed from a traditional Italian organized crime clan to an
Americanized national crime organization, American-raised mafia leaders like Charlie Luciano,
Frank Costello and Vito Genovese deliberately guided the organization to profit off of changes in
US governance. Smuggling and bootlegging activities of the American mafia drummed up public
support for the organization and helped cultivate corrupt government connections. Instead of
simply being part of an unwelcome immigrant class, ACN members broke Prohibition laws so as
to move into a higher strata of American culture.
The repeal of Prohibition forced the ACN to broaden their activities and adapt them to fit
the lifestyles’ of citizens during the Great Depression. Many of these activities were aided by the
political reform measures of the New Deal. Loan sharking schemes assisted suffering citizens
who could not receive loans from banks, while the New Deal strengthened unions became tools
of extortion for ACN members on the waterfront and in construction areas. Furthermore, the
increasing size of the US government in response to the Great Depression created a multitude of
opportunities for the ACN to accrue more power, influence, and wealth. With a solid structure
for the ACN’s national organization, the adaptations by the American mafia in the 1930s were
significant because they proved to its members that they could continue to profit after
Prohibition’s repeal.
92

The continuing Americanization of the ACN and their ongoing relationship with the US
government during World War II and into the 1950s. By increasing ties to government action,
particularly through the areas of intelligence and the black market, the American mafia gained
power, respectability, and prestige. Diversifying their activities again after the end of World War
II allowed the ACN to profit in the prosperous climate of the 1950s. However, the organization’s
entrance into narcotics trafficking augmented crime rates, increased law-enforcement corruption,
tore through inner city neighborhoods within the United States, and decreased public support of
the American mafia. Finally, the Apalachin conference revealed to the entire nation that a
shadowy criminal organization existed, and this revelation initiated government investigations
into the ACN that would last for decades and eventually diminish the American mafia’s power in
the underworld.
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